

XIV

THE PARTY SYSTEM IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE: AN ASSESSMENT

CALVIN WOODWARD

The history of political parties in Sri Lanka is a comparatively short one. The party system has been in operation for less than thirty years, or a little over forty if one relates its origin to the parties and associations which formed and were active under the Donoughmore Constitution. One may well question the propriety, analytically, of essaying an assessment of an entity of such shallow historical depth. The evolution of the party system has surely not yet reached final form; in character it may change dramatically, its growth may be aborted or it may fall victim to a system-destructive event. It may be, in short, too soon in the life of the party system to characterize or assess it.

The problem posed by this is compounded by the inherently dynamic quality of political parties themselves. The present generation of scholars was made alert to this by Sigmund Neumann¹ and Maurice Duverger,² the pioneering efforts of whom did much to advance the study of modern political parties. Seen in their light, parties are highly adaptive and responsive organisms, shaping, and in turn being shaped by, the environment in which they act. Ideologically and organizationally, parties, in their internal and external relations, are persistently changing units. They can be captured analytically in a moment of time, their biographies can be recorded, but their future is predictable with scarcely a modicum of certainty. Who in 1947, for example, would have thought it possible that the parties of Philip Gunawardena and J. R. Jayawardene would, within twenty years, combine in a coalition, or that a party would emerge and wrest power from a parent-party so entrenched as the United National Party became in its early years? Such, however, are experiences natural in the life of parties.³

The assessment of the party system of Sri Lanka must be respectful of the limitations which the nature of party and the brevity of the Ceylonese party experience

1. "Why Study Political Parties?" and "Toward a Comparative Study of Political Parties", in Sigmund Neumann (ed.), *Modern Political Parties*, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1956, pp. 1-6, 395-421.
2. *Political Parties: Their Organization and Activity in the Modern State* Nethuen and Co., Ltd. London, 1954.
3. The opportunistic bent of political parties is strongly argued by S. J. Eldersveld, *Political Parties: A Behavioural Analysis*, Rand McNally and Co., Chicago, 1964.

impose. Mindful of this, there are nevertheless at least two good reasons why one should proceed with an attempt to assess the formative period of the party system in Sri Lanka. First, the years since independence comprise an eventful and productive period in the growth of the Sri Lankan party system.⁴ The difference between the party system of today and that of 1947 is both vivid and essential; the progress made may in fact be uniquely remarkable. Second, the element of time is not in all ways a crucial variable. As has been mentioned, all parties and their systems evolve eternally. Analytically, the assessment of the Ceylonese party experience is not different from that which might be done on more established party systems of greater historical depth. The similarity is explicitly confirmed by Sir Ivor Jennings, in his careful study of the growth of British parties. "It must not be assumed," Sir Ivor concluded, "that the party system of the present generation is in its final and permanent form". On the contrary, he argued, the British party system "... is in perpetual evolution...⁵"

The evolution of the British party system transpired in alliance with the parliamentary system of government. The growth and development of both systems were essential to the viability of British democracy. A similar relationship appears to be manifest in the political development of Sri Lanka. The durability evinced by the democracy established at independence is undoubtedly Sri Lanka's most notable political achievement. Election campaigns have been competitive and orderly, power has peacefully been passed from incumbent to rival party coalitions, parliament has been an articulate and productive forum, and voter turnout, which is among the highest in the world, has reflected the depth of public support for both the party system and parliamentary democracy. To say this is not to ignore the frequent proclamation and extension of states of emergency, the communal discord and riot, the insurrection and other more or less severe challenges which have tested the strength of the democratic system over the years. The evidence to which the sceptic and the cynic could with reason refer is considerable. There is also a good body of thoughtful scholarly and informed opinion which considers the Ceylonese polity to be both vulnerable and volatile. Few would deny that this polity exists in a state of "dangerous equilibrium" as A. Jeyaratnam Wilson has said,⁶ and surely it faces the kinds of challenges to the political order described by Robert Kearney.⁷ But the essential point should not be missed: that is, that the Ceylonese democracy has so far managed to deal with problems which, the common fare of the new states, have elsewhere eventuated in the failure of the democratic experiment.

The vitality of parliamentary democracy, the enduring viability of the political system, directly relate to major changes which parties and the party system have undergone.⁸ Initially, the form of the party system was of patent fairly typical of new

4. For a history and analysis of the development of the party system till 1965 see my book *The Growth of a Party System in Ceylon*, (Brown University Press, Providence, 1969).

5. *Party Politics: The Growth of Parties*, (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1961), p. 2.

6. *Politics in Sri Lanka, 1947-1973*, (MacMillan Press, Ltd., London and Basingstoke, 1974).

7. *The Politics of Ceylon (Sri Lanka)*, (Cornell University Press, Ithaca and London, 1973).

8. Neumann suggested in 1956 that the "development of a responsible party system could well be the secret of a successful transition from colonialism to political self-rule". *op. cit.*, p. 420.

states emerging from colonial custody. Common to that was the sovereignty assumed and exercised by the dominant forces participant in the struggle for independence. Too often, however, the custodians of the new order tended either to assume a monolithic power or to disintegrate under the pressure of internecine discord and the strains of government. Both of these tendencies were at work in Sri Lanka in the years after independence when, what I should like to refer to as "the first party system", that which existed from 1948 to 1956, was in operation. A comparison between that party system and the contemporary one, the relevance of both to the survival of democracy, form the content of this paper.

The First Party System

The configuration of the first party system and the nature of the parties of which it was composed raised serious doubts about the survivability of the democracy then extant. The formation of the United National Party and the strong government it provided for eight years were, of course, positive—even essential—achievements. S. W. R. D. Bandaranaike, for one, was well aware of the symbiotic relationship between the foundation of the UNP and the stability of the early Ceylonese democracy. The UNP gave Ceylon, he said, "the stability of government which was needed particularly at the beginning of a new era of freedom."⁹ The coin, however, had another side. Ominous was the fact, and Bandaranaike was cognizant of it, that the UNP contained in its ranks almost all the liberal, democratic forces in the First and Second Parliaments. Referring to the party situation as it existed before 1951, Bandaranaike said that in Parliament there was "only one party, as all the important opposition parties are those which, owing to their Marxist beliefs, have no faith in democracy or the parliamentary system as we understand those terms."¹⁰

The revolutionary design and objective of leading opposition parties at this time was manifest. Calvin R. de Silva proudly acknowledged the fact. "In the Opposition" he said, "there are three revolutionary parties".¹¹ He was referring, of course, to the Lanka Sama Samaja Party, the Communist Party and his own Bolshevik-Leninist Party of India. The linkage of these parties to international and revolutionary movements was also an admission proudly made. Moreover, these parties announced their lack of confidence in the new political system, particularly their distrust of the UNP to manage it democratically. "We suffer no illusions", De Silva said, "about the possibilities of a Parliamentary regime".¹² Over these years, Marxist parties remained sceptical participants in the parliamentary drama, their leadership advocating revolutionary goals and means, and their militant membership kept mobilized for any exigency that might develop.

The remainder of the Opposition in the First Parliament consisted of communalist parties and a number of independents. Neither the Ceylon Indian Congress

9. House of Representatives, *Debates*, Vol. X, col. 698.

10. *Speeches and Writings*, (Government Press, Colombo, 1963), p. 138.

11. House of Representatives, *Debates*, Vol. I, col. 365.

12. *Ibid.*, col. 195.

nor the Ceylon Tamil bloc led by S. J. V. Chelvanayakam "rejoiced" over independence and both had little faith in the democracy of the new system. The ability of the Opposition to balance the Government was, in any case, seriously impaired by the fact that it was numerically weak and divided. Often in these early years, Opposition elements fought so bitterly among themselves that rarely could unity be achieved for an anti-Government stand. Co-operation between parties of the Opposition was as difficult to realize as was a workable relationship in Parliament between the Government and Opposition.¹³

The potential for alternative government afforded by the formation of the Sri Lanka Freedom Party in 1951 was dampened by the "dictatorial majority" by which the UNP was returned in the election of 1952: a majority enhanced by the wreckage of the Ceylon Indian Congress as a result of the enactment of citizenship laws which in effect disfranchised Indian Tamils. After the election of 1952 especially, a one party trend appeared to be leading inevitably, as it was elsewhere among new states toward the institutionalization of a monolithic party system. This was confirmed in some minds by certain actions taken by the UNP which appeared, or was alleged, to be motivated by an urge to entrench itself irrevocably in power. The rhetoric by which this fear was expressed perhaps exaggerated the case. Similarly, the UNP may have been unfair in regard to the charges for which it indicted oppositional elements. Nonetheless, the UNP placed no more trust in the Opposition than did the latter in it. It exploited the political profit of an Opposition it considered to be anti Buddhist, internationalist, communalist and communist. Moreover, it took steps and maintained vigil against what it alleged to be revolutionary preparations initiated by Marxist parties. Bandaranaike was prone to interpret this guardianship of the UNP as being purposely self-serving. The UNP leadership, he said, "... under the pretext of the need to protect democracy, resorted to various undemocratic and even anti-democratic methods to keep themselves in power".¹⁴

The victory of the Mahajana Eksath Peramuna in 1956, the smooth transfer of power to that new force by the UNP, tend to belie certain of the charges made against the UNP in its early years. Rare is the party which, having the means, hesitates to assume power absolutely. There were instances to regret, and many were the faults and defects, but the Ceylonese democracy may forever be beholden to the Senanayakes and the initial period of UNP rule. Nevertheless, the eight years of the first party system comprise a politically tense period. The party system was precariously poised between poles of dictatorship and revolution. While opposing tendencies may often usefully produce a balancing effect that pulls to the centre, they may also induce a mortal confrontation. The fear, quite obviously, was that the first party system might be pulled apart from two different directions. The fear was made especially real by the fact that there was no viable non-revolutionary alternative to the UNP. Until the SLFP organized a coalition, voters had no means to express a loss of confidence in the Government without, at the same time, undermining the parliamentary system.

13. See A. Jeyaratnam Wilson, "Oppositional Politics in Ceylon (1947-1968)", *Government and Opposition*, Vol. 9, No. 1, pp. 54-69.

14. Bandaranaike, *op. cit.*, p. 153.

The importance of the MEP triumph was that it brought to power a party in which voters had confidence and which in turn was committed to parliamentary democracy.

The stress of two potentially fatal tendencies was made more disturbing by the fact that the popular underpinning of parliament and the party system was tenuous and undeveloped. Parliament was not a meaningful institution so far as the mass of voters were concerned, primarily because the parties which managed it were not effectively functioning as intermediaries between the people and their political institutions. Parties were largely notable-determined units linked organizationally to voters through a myriad of personal influence structures which at the level of the constituency were committed personally to party candidates. Voting behaviour was personalistic as electors cast ballots for local notables with little regard for their party affiliation. Personal trust in a candidate, for a variety of mainly ascriptive reasons, took priority over questions of policy, issues or platforms. For their part, parties decided policy in caucus, cabinet or council without serious consultation with voters.

Parties were meaningful political units, however, at the level of Parliament where they were used to service the ambitions of elected notables. They were serviceable components, in this vital way, of the parliamentary system, because they produced the permanent alignments needed to make the parliamentary system work. They were instrumental, as well, in inducing the decline of the politically independent notable, by making that position unprofitable to the political careerist.

Parties thus performed useful services during this initial period of party growth in Sri Lanka. What they did not do, however, is equally important. Their failures, more than their success, mark distinct this early phase of party development. Most serious were the sociological defects of parties during this period. Voters were only indirectly linked to parties and the parliamentary alignments they formed. Because of this, neither had meaning to voters and neither enjoyed a substructure of popular support. Secondly, the notable-determined nature of parties kept them aloof from currents of public opinion. This, of course, affected most deeply the governing party. It was not until later, however, that the UNP came to understand that its defeat in 1956 was directly attributable to the fact that it had lost touch with the pulse of the people. There was substance to the charge that N. M. Perera made in 1948. He said then that the UNP appeared to assume a "Divine Right to rule".¹⁵

The negative aspects of the first party system can be exaggerated. The custodial bias of this predominantly UNP era helped politics to adapt to the mechanics of parliamentary democracy. Moreover, it ensured order and an orderly transition to democratic politics.¹⁶ Importantly, the strength evinced by the UNP may well have dissuaded revolutionary parties from pursuing an ideologically chosen path.

15. House of Representatives, *Debates*, Vol. I, col. 60.

16. W. Howard Wriggins, speaking of the first ten years of independence, wrote in 1960 that the Ceylonese had "...managed many intricate problems in a decade of relatively orderly government". *Ceylon: Dilemmas of a New Nation*, (Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1960), p. 458.

The Contemporary Party System

The contrast between the contemporary party system and its predecessor is sharp. Comparatively it reflects the extent and essentiality of the growth experienced by the party system since its origin nearly thirty years ago. While further growth may modify its present character, the contemporary party system is distinguished by three principal qualities: (1) its bipolarity, structurally and functionally, (2) its capacity to effect alternative government, and (3) the centrality of political view which governs the spectrum of parties effectively engaged in the political process.

The form of the party system is, of course, obviously multiparty. Except for the fact that one party is no longer dominant, there has been no significant change numerically in the surface structure of the party system since the SLFP emerged in 1951. Appearances to the contrary, the party system has become bipolar in two important areas of its operation. In the first place, election contests at the constituency level are predominantly biparty. In every election, beginning with that of 1956, and excepting that of March 1960 when political forces multiplied and were in disarray, the percentage of the vote taken by the first two candidates in almost every constituency exceeded 90% of the vote.¹⁷ Equally important is the fact that candidates involved in these biparty contests were associated with one or the other of the two party coalitions or ententes that have done fairly regular battle at elections since 1956.

In Parliament, the organizing principle inherited from the Westminster model has not consistently produced a stable bi-party division. A clear distinction between Government and Opposition has often been blurred by the tactical preference of some Marxist and communalist parties to operate, at times, in parliamentary limbo. Since 1956, however, parliamentary power has pivoted about the two principal political coalitions which in constituencies effect biparty election contests. The biparty electoral pattern is thus replicated in parliament in alignments which form or approximate a workable, though erosive, Government-Opposition division. The UNP and the SLFP, of course, are the kingpins of the biparty pattern. They are the cores about which smaller, sometimes satellite, parties gravitate to produce both electoral and parliamentary coalitions. These coalitions are, in turn, the key to the capacity for alternative government which the party system has come to assume. The fact that every election since 1956 has returned to power a party or coalition rival to that of the incumbent, strongly suggests that this capacity has, in fact, become institutionalized.

There are several critical dates and events that mark the development of this capacity. There is first, quite clearly, the success of the SLFP-led coalition in the election of 1956. Above all, it demonstrated the possibility of alternative government. The election of July 1960 proved that the SLFP was not an ephemeral phenomenon; that its political base of power went deeper and that it was not solely dependent upon the personal charisma of its founder. Its survival was at issue a year earlier when some opinion, at least, considered it to be finished as a mass party. The re-emergence of the UNP in the election of 1960 equally proved its vitality to sceptics and others

17. Woodward, *op. cit.*, p. 250.

alike. More important perhaps, was its return to power in 1965 when it, in addition, demonstrated its ability to forge electoral coalitions as impressive and expedient as that put together by the SLFP. Implicit in the construction of coalitions by both these parties is the improvement in relations among all parties. The conclusion of no-contest pacts, the delegation of cabinet posts among intensely ambitious leaders and the workability of coalition governments evince the kind of sophistication and cooperation which generally were lacking in the first party system.

The construction of these coalitions has been facilitated by the fact that durable components of the party system have all tended to adopt, at least on important questions, a centrist political view. The party system now operates within a consensus generally supportive of parliamentary democracy. The two pivots of the party system, the UNP and the SLFP, mobilize a mass social base along similar, though not identical, politically liberal, moderately socialist and traditionalist, lines. The election of neither eventuates in fundamental change. The "coalition-draw" of these two parties has helped pull formerly radical and revolutionary parties toward the centre. The pressures and opportunities natural to politics have, over the years, modified the revolutionary parties of the first party system. All of them have now served in governing coalitions and indicate, by their platforms and action, support for the system. The original Marxist parties have been encouraged, at no little expense and effort, to amputate their recalcitrant, revolutionary sections. This has, for one thing, released an inner tension that long disturbed the external relations of these parties. Their explicit adoption, finally, of a parliamentary orientation acknowledges, at the very least, their security within the parliamentary system. At the same time, the fatality at the polls of the revolutionary elements purged from these parties manifests the un-responsiveness of public opinion to a revolutionary solution of political and social questions. Their regular defeat is one more measure of popular support for parliamentary democracy.

The underpinning of the contemporary party system is also deeper and firmer than that of its predecessor. Intense political competition has compelled systematically useful changes on the part of parties and these have helped to solidify their foundations. In the first place, they have become consumer-oriented, socially determined units. All parties have developed increasingly sophisticated formal organizations that link them directly with voters. Ideological questions and policy decisions are now taken with an ear to voter demands and platforms are devised to sell in the marketplace of votes. The intimacy that has developed between parties and voters is reflected in the strong party-orientation of the Ceylonese electorate.¹⁸ While personal considerations still weigh in elections, the decisive factor now appears to be parties, their platforms and the issues they raise. These developments, the fact that voters have felt their power to elect and defeat governments and thereby influence policy directly, have underscored public support for the party and parliamentary system.

18. This is the thesis of my article, "Sri Lanka's Electoral Experience: From Personal to Party Politics", *Pacific Affairs*, Vol. 47, No. 4 (Winter 1974-75), pp. 455-471. See also A. Jeyaratnam Wilson, *Electoral Politics in an Emergent State*, (Cambridge University Press, 1975).

The inability of new parties to take root is further evidence of the firm popular footing on which the established party system rests. Substantially, the party system is composed of the same parties today as in 1951 after the formation of the SLFP. The disorder that followed the break-up of the MEP, and the consequent effort by various leaders of that coalition to found their own parties failed to give birth to a single durable party. Some short-lived personality parties later saw fit to join, or to permit their absorption by, larger, more established parties. This failure of new parties, the precipitous decline in voter support for politically independent candidates, suggests that most elements of public opinion are content with the faculty of durable parties to articulate and represent their interests. The traditionalist garb in which the contemporary party system is clothed, its use of indigenous language, give it, as well, the aura and appearance of a peoples' servant. The first party system did not convincingly convey this important image.

The strengths of the contemporary party system developed in response to the weaknesses of the earlier one. Obviously, the present party system has deficiencies of its own and is confronted by serious challenges which it is obliged to master. Foremost of these is the consumer-orientation which governs party competition. Parties, quite frankly, might not only outbid each other for votes, but also develop demands which go beyond the capacity of the society to satisfy. The insurrection of 1971 may well reflect one instance of this. Certainly it counsels caution and, if possible, a slow-down in the spiraling inflation of promises that parties have been making since the election of 1956. The fear is that the imperatives of party competition will not permit a vitality needed arrestation or reduction of promises to voters.

Parties also, especially their coalitions, still tend to be collections of odd bed-fellows. The SLFP, in particular, is pulled between two wings, one seeking accommodation with Marxist partners, and the other pulling toward the parent-UNP from which the party originally emerged. Given the overwhelming majorities by which the SLFP has been returned, this inner tension might not be all together a bad thing. The UNP has often been so decimated at the polls that the prime restraint on the SLFP has come from within itself. In this sense, the party acts as both Government and Opposition. This is an oddity, but it is nonetheless systemically useful because the UNP has consistently enjoyed greater support among voters than that suggested by the small number of seats it sometimes wins, most notably in the elections of 1956, July 1960 and especially that of 1970. The empathy that exists between the UNP and the conservative side of the SLFP may therefore help compensate for the distortion of the public will which results from the special circumstances of electoral coalitions and the electoral system itself.

The mold of other Sinhalese parties has hardened more than has that of the SLFP. The cohesion of the UNP, however, is challenged every time its fortunes decline. It is pulled within, not so much by ideological wings, but by ambitious factions and leaders seeking a surer road to power than that provided by the UNP during a political ebbtide. Traditional Marxist parties appear to have settled major differences within and among themselves. As the Labour Party did in Great Britain in the course of its evolution, the LSSP, MEP and CP have gradually deradicalized. Differences of

opinion excite debate in both parties and internal alignments form and divide on questions of tactics and policy. Inner-party tension, to some degree, stems from the contrast between the mundane needs and orientation of party followers and the visionary goals of the party intelligensia. This may be a strain endemic to working class parties. The British Labour Party has still not calmed a similar debate in its own ranks.

The position of forces potentially disturbing to the system has radically changed over the years. Importantly, they have been ostracized from the established party system, or at worst, cast to the less damaging periphery of that system. Revolutionary parties, however, are still operative, though they have been able to attach to themselves only marginal public support. The marginality of that support, however depends on the ability of established parties to remain responsive to the demand, emanating from their constituencies. Outcast parties, such as the CP (Peking), the "purists" of LSSP schisms and the recently proscribed Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna, remain at the fringe awaiting the failure of the established party system. The FP, stronger now than in the first party system, exists in two worlds. In the legitimate one of parliamentary democracy, it gives cautious, calculated support to the Sinhalese party system. In the less legitimate one beyond parliament, it threatens the Sinhalese party system by using potentially system-disturbing devices and strategies. It has, however, served in a Government and, if conditions can be made right, may not be averse to serving in one again in the future. Despite its periodic withdrawal, the FP has been instrumental in maintaining a political association between Ceylon Tamils and the Sinhalese through the nexus of the party system. Its extra-parliamentary activity, like the politically-motivated strikes of Marxist parties, may be more system-supportive than damaging. Such behaviour can often serve to warn parliamentary majorities of the real power at the disposal of a party whose minority status in Parliament may be an inaccurate expression of its true political strength. Extra-parliamentary tactics, may provide a useful mechanism, available to all parties, to correct a parliamentary imbalance, or to keep the party system mindful of the need not to go beyond the delicate consensus on which the Ceylonese democracy has been carefully built.

Questions of a communalist nature and a political rhetoric whose content may have valid grounds pose problems for the contemporary party system. Communal divisions have been more intense since 1956, and formerly inter-communalist parties have found need to cater to the interests of the majority community. Political rhetoric has its communalist bent, though much of it, as before, is directed against Governments for conduct alleged to be arrogant, arbitrary, or indicative of dictatorial inclinations. Now that the capacity for alternative government is ensured,¹⁹ however, the validity of rhetorical criticism can be effectively assessed in the court of public opinion and a verdict rendered at the polls. The fear, of course, is that persistently bitter exchanges can damage public confidence in the party system or that Governments can be induced to engage in irresponsible conduct in defense of their position. Similarly, parties may be led to promise "impossible dreams" to convince voters of

19. While it is too early to evaluate fully its effect on the party system, the recent constitutional change seems definitely to have strengthened the position of Governments.

the insincerity or aloofness of an incumbent rival. This danger, more now than before, is the special burden borne by the contemporary party system.

The contemporary party system and the one from which it descended, share a heritage of particularly Ceylonese gift. A certain historical continuity is to be expected. The growth manifest in the contrast between the early and contemporary party systems, however, is provocative. The party systems of longer established democracies, such as Great Britain, the United States and Canada, took more years to attain a comparable level of growth. The principle of alternative government, for example, was effectuated more expeditiously in Sri Lanka than in these older democracies. The capacity of the Canadian party system to author alternative government was not confirmed until thirty years after Confederation. The impressive electoral machine directed by Sir John A. MacDonal, which fathered Confederation in 1867, held almost unbroken political sway nationally from 1854 to 1896. In the United States, an opposition party founded under Thomas Jefferson appropriated the office of president from the Federalist Party eleven years after the union was established. It took another twenty four years to dislodge the Jeffersonian Republicans from that office and to consolidate the biparty pattern since extant. The process of alternative government was slow to take root in Great Britain following the Great Reform which initiated modern party development. Between 1830 and 1875, the years of the great "Liberal supremacy", the Conservative Party realized office only once, under Sir Robert Peel from 1841 to 1845. Equally arresting is the fact that the central offices of the two great parties remained embryonic until the 1870's. In Sri Lanka, party organization grew at a more rapid pace than it did in the mother of parliamentary democracy.

The Ceylonese party system, of course, had over a century of modern party experience from which to draw and on which to model itself. The UNP and the SLFP, quite specifically, looked for example to the mass parties of Great Britain and the United States. Similar tutors and models, however, invited the emulation of party architects in all the new states, yet in perhaps none of them save Israel has a party system worked as well as that of Sri Lanka. In Asia, certainly, the Ceylonese case is exceptional. "Asian politics are caught in a profound dilemma", Lucien Pye noted in 1966; "they can neither get along well with political parties nor work well without them".²⁰ It is to the credit of the Ceylonese party system that neither of these poles describe the first quarter century of party experience.

20. "Party Systems and National Development in Asia", in Joseph La Polambara and Myron Weiner (eds), *Political Parties and Political Development*, (Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1966), p. 369.