

Pythagoras, Birth-Rememberer

IT is remarkable that the earliest references to Pythagoras' teaching of reincarnation,—which are also the earliest reliable evidence on the Greek teachings of reincarnation as a whole,—largely associate him with a power of recollecting past births or recognizing the present and future states of existence of himself and others.

Since Linforth's notable study of the evidence on Orphism,¹ it is now more than ever a matter of doubt whether a belief in reincarnation was part of early Orphic doctrine. However, even if the allusions to an avoidance of killing and a regimen of vegetarianism in the evidence before 300 B.C.² are taken to presuppose some such belief, found sufficiently well attested in respect of later Orphism, there is no hint of anything like birth-recollection or birth-recognition associated with Orpheus or his early adherents. Pherecydes' alleged teaching of metempsychosis, as against the immortality of the soul, first appears in Suidas³ one and a half thousand years after him, and on whose authority we do not know. The association of Pherecydes with Pythagoras in tradition has support in the early evidence of Ion of Chios⁴ and Aristotle.⁵ Apparently Pherecydes was a divine of sorts (*θεολόγος*) and a miracle-worker (*τερατοποιός*) who was regarded as of high moral attainment⁶ and possessed great prophetic powers.⁷ But

1. *The Arts of Orpheus*, Berkeley, California. (1941).

2. Arist. *Frogs* 1032; Eur. *Hippolytus* 952-953; Plato *Laws* 782c. Such observances, though consequent on a belief in reincarnation, need not necessarily imply it. See also H. S. Long *A Study of the Doctrine of Metempsychosis in Greece from Pythagoras to Plato*, diss. Princeton, N. Jersey. (1948) append. II, pp. 89—92.

3. s. v. *Pherecydes*. Cic. *Tusc. Disp.* i. 16. 38, and Apon. *In Cant. Cant.* v. p. 95 f. = *Vors.* (7.A.5). (Note: abbreviation *Vors.* will be used throughout this article for H. Diels and W. Krauz *Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker*, (Greek and German) 6th. ed. Berlin (1951—52). Fragment-numbering, where not otherwise qualified, follows this.)

4. fr. 4. See p. 230 f. below.

5. *Vors.* (14. A. 7). i. c. vol. I. p. 98 = fr. 191 (Rose). . . . Πυθαγόρας Μνησάρχου υἱὸς τὸ μὲν πρῶτον διεπονεῖτο περὶ τὰ μαθήματα καὶ τοὺς ἀριθμούς, ὕστερον δέ ποτε καὶ τῆς Φερεκύδου τερατοποιίας οὐκ ἀπέστη. (. . . Pythagoras, the son of Mnesarchus, first worked at mathematics and number, but later could not desist from the miracle-working of Pherecydes.)

6. Ion. *loc. cit.*

7. See Diog. i. 116 = *Vors.* (7. A. 1). i. c. vol. I. p. 43.

even if he was Pythagoras' teacher, as the Aristotle-fragment implies, there is no justification from evidence for attributing to him the same psychic power of birth-recollection for which Pythagoras was reputed.

Of Epimenides, however, Diogenes Laertius⁸ preserves the tradition that he claimed to have been Aeacus and to have lived many times on earth. Diogenes' words clearly imply that Epimenides claimed to be Aeacus re-born, and there can be no question here of anything like psychic excursions of the shamanistic type being suggested. The tradition of Epimenides' knowledge of the distant past appears of respectable antiquity and was known to Aristotle,⁹ while his particular comment that Epimenides' assertions were about the vanished past and not about things to be might, if anything, support the hypothesis that such knowledge was acquired through birth-remembering. As Dodds¹⁰ rightly observes, however, it would be unwise to build too much on this.

On the other hand, in fr. 129 Empedocles talks of just such a kind of knowledge of the past arising from a recollection of past incarnations of a man whom, unfortunately, the extant verses of the fragment fail to identify, but who, there is good reason to think, is none other than Pythagoras. Diogenes¹¹ is found quoting two verses from it and holding, on the authority of Timaeus, that it referred to Pythagoras. The fuller quotation we have here, including the verses given by Diogenes, is found in Porphyry¹² and again in Iamblichus.¹³ In it Empedocles describes a man of phenomenal mental powers in the following manner :

8. i. 114=Vors. (3. A. 1), i.e. vol. I, p. 29: λέγεται δὲ ὡς καὶ πρῶτος (πρῶτον Casaubon; αὐτὸς cj. Diels). αὐτὸν Αἰακὸν λέγοι . . . προσποιηθῆναι τε πολλάκις ἀναβεβιωκέναι. (Tradition has it that he declared he was first Aeacus and claimed to have lived many times on earth.)

9. Rhet. 1418a24: ἐκεῖνος γὰρ περὶ τῶν ἐσομένων οὐκ ἔμαντεύετο, ἀλλὰ περὶ τῶν γεγονότων, ἀδήλων δέ. (He did not make declarations about things of the future, but about things of the vanished past.)

10. *The Greeks and the Irrational*, Berkeley, California, (1951), p. 143.

11. viii. 54. Here he says: 'Ακοῦσαι δ' αὐτὸν Πυθαγόρου Τίμαιος διὰ τῆς ἐνάτης ἱστορεῖ, λέγων ὅτι καταγνωσθεῖς ἐπὶ λογοκλοπία τότε, καθὰ καὶ Πλάτων, τῶν λόγων ἐκωλύθη μετέχειν. μεμνήσθαι δὲ καὶ αὐτὸν Πυθαγόρου λέγοντα, 'Ἦν δέ τις . . .' (Timaeus says in his ninth book that he (Empedocles) was a pupil of Pythagoras and mentions that he was caught plagiarizing at that time, just as Plato, and prevented from sharing in the teachings; also that he refers to Pythagoras with the words, 'There was among them...').

12. *Vit. Pyth.* 30.

13. *Vit. Pyth.* 67.

ἦν δέ τις ἐν κείνοισιν ἀνὴρ περιώσια εἰδώς,
 ὃς δὴ μῆκιστον πραπίδων ἐκτήσατο πλοῦτον,
 παντοίων τε μάλιστα σοφῶν <τ' > ἐπιήρανος ἔργων·
 ὁππότε γὰρ πάσησιν ὀρέξαιτο πραπίδεσσι,
 ῥεῖ' ὃ γε τῶν ὄντων πάντων λεύσσεσκεν ἕκαστον
 καὶ τε δέκ' ἀνθρώπων καὶ τ' εἴκοσιν αἰώνεσσιν.

(There was among them a man of remarkable knowledge, who had acquired the extremest wealth of the intellect, one expert in all sorts of wise deeds. For whenever he reached out with all the power of his intellect, he easily discerned each one of existing things in ten and even twenty lifetimes of men.)

Some doubts seem to have existed among the ancients as to whether the allusion was in fact to Pythagoras; Diogenes¹⁴ remarks that there were some who thought that it was Parmenides who was meant. Timaeus, who is the only authority given by Diogenes for his own ascription of it to Pythagoras, is not the most reliable of writers even in the eyes of antiquity.¹⁵ Iamblichus himself is somewhat shaky; he says 'it appears' (*φαίνεται*) to refer to Pythagoras, either finding independently cause for some uncertainty, or finding uncertainty in his (and Porphyry's?) source, more likely than not, Nicomachus.¹⁶ Even if the suggestion of Parmenides be rejected on the grounds of improbability and the fact that those who raised it need not have been much earlier than Diogenes himself, still it is possible that, as Rathmann¹⁷ points out, the allusion may be to Empedocles himself, or as Zeller,¹⁸ to some imaginary person. Empedocles believed himself to have been born many times before and appeared to be able to recollect these previous births.¹⁹

14. *loc. cit.*

15. Suid. s. v. *Timaeus*; Polyb. xii.—an opinion which might be supported by what Timaeus says in this instance, i.e. that Empedocles and Plato both plagiarized the teachings of Pythagoras, and moreover that Empedocles was a pupil of Pythagoras, whereas in fact a century divides the life of the two.

16. See E. Rohde 'Die Quellen des Iamblichus in seiner Biographie des Pythagoras,' *Kleine Schriften* II, Tübingen und Leipzig. (1901), pp. 102-172=*Rh. Mus.* vol. XXVI (1871), pp. 554-576 and vol. XXVII (1872), p. 23-61 (esp. pp. 136=*Rh. Mus.* p. 31).

17. *Quaestiones Pythagoraeae Orphicae Empedocleae*, diss. Halle (1933), p. 138.

18. 'Über die ältesten Zeugnisse zur Geschichte des Pythagoras,' *S. P. A. W.* (1889), p. 989 f.

19. See fr. 117 in the light of fr. 129 and the general doctrine of reincarnation in fr. 115, 125, 126, 127, 136, 137, 146 and 147. The lives in fr. 117 seem carefully selected to illustrate the range of incarnations the occult-self (*δαίμων*) is capable of assuming, the 'all manner . . . of forms of mortal creatures' (*παντοῖα . . . εἶδεα θνητῶν*), when pursued from element to element by its sinfulness; see R. S. Bluck ed. *Plato's Meno.*, Cambridge. (1961), p. 69, and n. 55 below. Whether he only inferred this we do not know, but that certainly is not the impression he wished to give. Fr. 129 is evidence of his awareness of the power of birth-remembering possessed by Pythagoras, for instance, while fr. 112 (see also fr. 111) is evidence that he claimed to be a similarly exceptional sort of being himself. Long's argument, in *op. cit.* p. 61 on this point, that reincarnation would be no punishment unless recollection makes the soul aware of the blessed condition it had lost, shows a poor understanding of significance of the belief in religion.

All that there is then is the actual ascription of the reference to Pythagoras by Timaeus and its confirmation, if not with complete certainty, by Iamblichus. But the fact that Timaeus is found unreliable in certain instances does not necessarily impair his testimony in this instance, particularly when the fragment, far from precluding the possibility, makes it exceptionally likely that the reference is to Pythagoras. The uncertainty of Iamblichus, wherever it originated, could well be the result of having no more to go by than the verses of the fragment themselves. But after all, Iamblichus does ascribe it to Pythagoras and not to anyone else. Most recent writers²⁰ are therefore inclined to agree, against Rathmann, that the reference is to Pythagoras. Rathmann's arguments are not sufficiently convincing and his own ascription of it to an Orpheotelestes²¹ hardly likely to be correct.

Porphry understood this fragment in a sense that has nothing to do with anything more than this existence and experiences within it. He, in fact, thought it an appreciation of a remarkable power of perception possessed by Pythagoras, whereby, for instance, he was able to hear the harmony of spheres.²² What the verses themselves say, however, is that when he

20. W. Nestle's review of Rathmann *op. cit.* in *Philol. Woch.* vol. LIV (1934) cols. 407—409, and H. Gundert's in *Gnom.* vol. XIII (1937), p. 339; see also W. Schmid *Geschichte der griechischen Literatur* I. 1. Munchen (1929) p. 733, n. 1, W. Stettner *Die Seelenwanderung bei Griechen und Romern*, Tub. Beiter. zur Altertumsw. XXII Stuttgart—Berlin (1934), p. 16, f., W. H. Thomas *ΕΠΕΚΕΙΝΑ* Wurzburg (1938), p. 78, A. Cameron *The Pythagorean Background to the Theory of Recollection*, Menasha, Wisconsin, (1938), p. 20 f. etc. W. Jaeger *The Theology of the Early Greek Philosophers*, Oxford (1947), p. 151 remarks that the presumption that the reference was to Pythagoras was especially congenial to the Neoplatonists, but adds (p. 152): 'Even if he is not referring to Pythagoras in his description, it is very likely that the characteristic feature of the superman's knowledge of his own earlier existences has been borrowed from the Pythagoreans' traditional tales of their master, for something very similar was told about him.'

21. *op. cit.* p. 138.

22. *loc. cit.* He says: αὐτὸς δὲ τῆς τοῦ παντὸς ἀρμονίας ἠκροῶτο συνιείς τῆς καθολικῆς τῶν σφαιρῶν καὶ τῶν κατ' αὐτὰς κινουμένων ἀστέρων ἀρμονίας, ἧς ἡμᾶς μὴ ἀκούειν διὰ σμικρὸτητα τῆς φύσεως. τούτοις καὶ Ἐμπεδοκλῆς μαρτυρεῖ λέγων περὶ αὐτοῦ· ἦν . . . αἰώνεσσιν'. τὸ γὰρ περιώσια καὶ τῶν ὄντων λείσσεσκεν ἕκαστα καὶ πραπίδων πλοῦτον καὶ τὰ εἰκότα ἐμφαντικὰ μάλιστα τῆς ἐξαιρέτου καὶ ἀκριβεστέρας παρὰ τοὺς ἄλλους διοργανώσεως ἔν τε τῷ ὄραν καὶ τῷ ἀκούειν καὶ τῷ νοεῖν τοῦ Πυθαγόρου. (He heard the harmony of the Universe, apprehending the pure harmony of the spheres and of the stars that move about them, which we do not hear on account of the poverty of our nature. To these even Empedocles bears witness, saying of him, 'There was among them. . . .' For 'remarkable' and 'he discerned each one of existing things' and 'wealth of the intellect' are alike expressions of the especial and exceptionally keen forming of sight and hearing and intellect in Pythagoras.) See also Sch. Ambros. on a. 371, according to whom Pythagoras said he heard the harmony of the spheres in an ecstasy (ἔξω γενόμενος τοῦ σώματος).

reached out with the full power of his intellect, he saw with ease 'each one of existing things in ten and even twenty lifetimes of men', emphasising thus the wider extent of experience he was able to draw upon as against that of the present life alone with other men,²³ and not as Porphyry thought, a remarkable power of perception or observation which enabled him to learn in one lifetime what other men could only with as many as ten or twenty lives.

On the other hand, recently Cameron understood this to be a recovery of pre-experiential knowledge which the soul had lost with incarnation, a knowledge which was the knowledge of Number.²⁴ But as Cherniss points out,²⁵ the fragment hardly warrants such an interpretation; it does not even mean a recollection of 'all things that are', i.e. the physical world, but simply 'everything that happened in ten and even twenty lifetimes of men'. There is no suggestion that the important part, or any part of Pythagoras' learning, consisted of knowledge that could only be acquired by a disembodied soul;²⁶ nor is his exceptional memory to be understood as the general foundation of all knowledge that is not derived from immediate experience.²⁷

A distinction must again be made between the knowledge derived by Pythagoras by this means and the 'wisdom' (σοφική) accredited to him by Heraclitus, Herodotus and Ion, which may to an extent have grown out of his studies (ἱστορίη) into the scriptures and teachings of certain Greek

23. ἀνθρώπων αἰώνεσσι ('in . . . lifetimes of men') is obviously a pleonasm as αἰώνες (lifetimes) is used only of human lives. Diels translates (F'rs. I, p. 364): 'in seinen zehn und zwanzig Menschenleben,' assuming the αἰώνες to be those of Pythagoras and ἀνθρώπων explanatory. Long (*op. cit.* p. 51) takes ἀνθρώπων as referring to Pythagoras' contemporaries during his long stay on earth in a variety of forms, and understands the last verse to mean 'in ten and twenty generations of men, that is, in about 1000 years'. But what we have here is quite clearly a poetic emphasis of the contrast between this remarkable man and ordinary men in respect of the power of recollection. The same kind of explanation would do for 'ten and twenty'; there is no attempt here to arrive at any definite figure such as 3000 years, (i.e. 10+20=30 lifetimes, with a lifetime reckoned at a 100 years), or with Long, (see also Cherniss' review of Cameron *op. cit.* in *Am. Journ. Philol.* vol. LXI (1940), p. 359. f, and Bluck *op. cit.* p. 65). 1000 years.

24. *op. cit.* p. 21. f. According to him, when Pythagoras knew 'all things that are', he knew the physical world, while his understanding was based on a power of memory during the course of existence. And since, for Empedocles,—as he thinks,—the soul of the individual had begun to forget when it was first bound to the human body, it follows that the transmigratory life was, in his eyes, a gradual recovery of the omniscience the divine soul once had before its human experience began.

25. *op. cit.* p. 359.

26. See Bluck *op. cit.* pp. 65—66.

27. See L. Robin 'Sur la doctrine de la Reminiscence' *Rev. Et. Gr.* vol. XXXII (1919), p. 452.

and alien religions.²⁸ Heraclitus contemptuously calls this a polymathy (*πολυμαθίη*) which does not yield intelligence (*νοῦς*). Empedocles, however, talking of Pythagoras with respect amounting to reverence, credits him with mental powers which excelled even such 'wisdom', for when he wielded his prodigious power of concentration, it appears he could even transcend the limits of the human intellect! Pythagoras is of 'remarkable knowledge' (*περιώσια εἰδώς*), for there is thus at his command a great store of knowledge and mastery over all kinds of wise deeds acquired by him in a long series of incarnations and accessible to him through his unique ability to recollect the experiences of these past incarnations. But this knowledge itself is purely experiential knowledge, even if not derived from the experiences of this particular life, with no hint that any part of it was acquired by the soul in a disincarnate state.

Aristoxenus is associated with Androcydes and Euboulides, two Pythagoreans, and with Hippobotus and Neanthes as recording that Pythagoras experienced metempsychosis every 216 years, this number being 6³ and known among the Pythagoreans as the 'psychogonic cube', and that this was consistent with his incarnation as Euphorbus; for, two such periods being abstracted therefrom brought one to the cycle (*περίοδος*) of the Pythagoras-incarnation.²⁹

In view of Heraclides' elaborate account of Pythagoras' prior incarnations,³⁰ it is significant that Aristoxenus and these others know only the instance of Euphorbus. Not only is this better supported in ancient writers, but, while being mentioned by a number of them to the exclusion of other identified incarnations, it also occurs in all and variant combinations.³¹

28. See Heraclitus fr. 129: *Πυθαγόρης Μνησάρχου ιστορίην ἤσκησεν ἀνθρώπων μάλιστα πάντων καὶ ἐκλεξάμενος ταύτας τὰς συγγραφὰς ἐποιήσατο ἑαυτοῦ σοφίην, πολυμαθίην, κακοτεχνίην.* Cf. Ion fr. 4. A *γνωμή* being an already formulated idea or opinion, *γνώμας εἶδε καὶ ἐξέμαθεν* clearly suggests that he knew them through learning from some other source. Cf. also Heraclitus fr. 40 for Pythagoras' *πολυμαθίη*. Herodotus ii. 123 would clearly imply that he adopted his teaching of reincarnation from the Egyptians, and ii. 81 perhaps the taboo on wool at burials, while iv. 95 associates him with certain teachings and practices of the Thracian Salmoxis (who, according to Herodotus himself, lived long before Pythagoras.) See also Ion fr. 2, where Pythagoras is said to have fathered some of his own compositions on Orpheus. Sandbach ('Ion of Chios on Pythagoras,' *Pr. of the Camb. Philol. Soc.* vol. CLXXXV, (n. s. vol. V), (1958—59), p. 36) therefore finds Pythagoras' *σοφίη* derived from other men.

29. Aristoxenus fr. 12 (Wehrli)= Theol. Arith. p. 40 Ast.

30. Heraclides fr. 89 (Wehrli)= Diog. viii. 4. See p. 223 below where this is quoted in full.

31. See Rohde *Psyche: the Cult of Souls and the Belief in Immortality among the Greeks*, transl. by W. B. Hillis. London (1925) append. X. pp. 598—599 for a list of the ancient writers who allude to the story.

The allusion to this seems to have come down with an anecdote that Pythagoras, to prove the fact of his having been Euphorbus, recognized the shield of Menelaus by whom Euphorbus was wounded in the Trojan War.

There is reason to think, therefore, that the legend must have been put forward at an early date. It would not be impossible that Pythagoras himself made the claim and that, perhaps, Xenophanes referred to it, as he did the anecdote of Pythagoras and the dog.³² The story itself is narrated in such a way as to imply that there were no intermediate incarnations between Euphorbus and Pythagoras,—they are definitely excluded in Lucian *Gallus* 17,—but this may be from one of many reasons. For instance, Pythagoras may himself have recalled the Euphorbus-incarnation casually and without implying anything as to other incarnations, whether earlier or later than Euphorbus; or again, he may have recalled this as his last human incarnation, or simply as his last incarnation before that as Pythagoras. The account here attributed to Aristoxenus, however, assumes two other incarnations presumably human, before that as Pythagoras, and these the resourceful Heracleides is quick to supply with 'Hermotimus' and an unknown fisherman, 'Pyrrhus'.

The act of recognition of Menelaus' shield is not only in character with Pythagoras' reputed power of recollection, but also parallels the many instances where identifications such as this have been resorted to or cited in recent times as proof in claims of rebirth. We just had Empedocles asserting that Pythagoras' power of birth-recollection was strong enough to reach back to as many as ten or twenty lifetimes, so that, on any reckoning,³³ his incarnation as Euphorbus should have been well within that perview, living as that man did, during the war of Troy. As for the shield of Menelaus, we may say that there was good reason for it to have impressed itself upon the mind of Euphorbus, being the possession of his slayer and perhaps the last thing he saw with the moment of death.

32. Xenophanes fr. 7. See p. 228 below.

33. The notion that he reincarnated every 216 years suggests reincarnation to be an exceptional feat or privilege restricted to Pythagoras. Diog. viii. 14 refers to a 'cycle of necessity' (*κύκλος ἀνάγκης*) and an interval of 207 years, the calculation being probably modified by reference to the chronologies of Apollodorus and Eratosthenes, though in fact based on the lives invented by Heracleides (i.e. Aethalides 1400 B.C.; Euphorbus 1193 B.C. (—the first year of the Trojan campaign, according to Apoll. and Erat.); Hermotimus 986 B.C.; Pyrrhus 779 B.C.; Pythagoras 572 B.C.). Xenophanes fr. 7. might indicate immediate reincarnation if the friend whose soul is reborn in the dog was a friend of Pythagoras in that very incarnation of his as Pythagoras. Immediate reincarnation is also what is suggested by Herodotus ii. 123. The version of Aristoxenus appears to be a cold abstraction devoid of religious implications, perhaps the product of a late mathematical misadventure into original Pythagorean eschatology.

Nothing is known of Euphorbus' life or character which would have specifically recommended him for incorporation into the series of prior incarnations of Pythagoras. Rohde³⁴ rightly dismisses the hypothesis that this was prompted by the fact that Euphorbus had, through his father Panthous, a special connection with Apollo and was thus a true 'Apollonic soul' (*ψυχὴ Ἀπολλωνιακὴ*). This would leave us with the etymology behind the name: *Εὐ-φορβος* = possibly 'one who eats the correct food', i.e. possibly 'nothing ensouled' (*οὐδὲν ἔμψυχον*).³⁵ So, the name of Pythagoras' father, Mnesarchus, might mean 'one who recollects his origin',³⁶ and from ancient times, as by Aristippus of Cyrene,³⁷ the significance of the name Pythagoras itself has not been missed. But then, the name of Pythagoras' father, Mnesarchus, is attested by no less than Heraclitus³⁸ and Herodotus³⁹ themselves, while the attempt to prove that Pythagoras himself was simply a fictitious character would hardly get behind the fact that there was a man and that he was called Pythagoras.⁴⁰

The skeletal pattern of Pythagoras' reincarnations referred to by Aristoxenus seems to have been,—as mentioned before,—elaborated upon by the Peripatetic, Heracleides of Pontus, while the determinism hinted in it appears as a most thoroughgoing piece of formalism, (perhaps under Stoic influence or the interpretation of Zeno himself in the work on *Pythagorean Matters* (*Πυθαγορικά*) attributed to him), in the concept of identical world-cycles in the evidence of Eudemus.⁴¹

34. *op. cit.* p. 559.

35. See Lucian *Gallus* 4, where the etymological significance is noticed and the name punned upon. Aristotle nowhere refers to a total abstinence from flesh by Pythagoreans, but his evidence of an avoidance of specific creatures and parts of creatures does not necessarily belie such a practice. Aristoxenus fr. 25, 28, 29a (Wehrli) actually declares that Pythagoras ate flesh and included particular varieties in his diet. Aristoxenus' associations were, however, with the followers of Philolaus, while a practice of total abstinence is amply evidenced in Middle Comedy fragments from many hands (see *Vors.* I, pp. 478—480) of certain ascetics or Pythagorean beggar-philosophers, popularly styled 'Pythagorists' (*Πυθαγορισταί*), who, to all appearances, continued the eschatological and religious practices of the original school.

36. See K. von Fritz 'Mnesarchos' *Pauly-Wiss: Real-Encycl.* vol XV, (1931/32) cols. 2270 f. See also O. Skutsch 'Notes on Metempsychosis,' *Cl. Philol.* vol. LIV (1959), p. 114. If this is an accident, he asks, which came first, the name of the father or the story of Pythagoras' remembering his origin?

37. See *Diog.* viii. 21.

38. Fr. 129.

39. iv. 95.

40. Remarkably enough, a similar symbolic etymology is associated with Pythagoras' closest Indian counterpart, and perhaps contemporary, the Buddha Gothama. For he was Siddharta, 'he by whom the end is accomplished'; his mother, Mahamaya or Mayadevi, is 'great, or divine illusion'; and strangely, his father, Suddhodana, 'one whose food is pure.' See R. Hardy *The Legends and Theories of the Buddhists*, London (1866), p. 72, where he extracts from Professor Wilson's lecture 'On Buddha and Buddhism' delivered before the Royal Asiatic Society on April 8th, 1854.

41. Fr. 88, (Wehrli). Cf. *Porph. Vit. Pyth.* 19.

Heracleides was a pupil of Plato, it appears,⁴² before he followed the teaching of Aristotle. Diogenes⁴³ mentions him as having heard the Pythagoreans first, but this may merely be an inference from his writings on Pythagorean matters. A work *Concerning the Pythagoreans* (περὶ τῶν Πυθαγορείων) is mentioned among the titles of works attributed to him by Diogenes, but notices on Pythagoras and Pythagoreanism must have appeared passim in his writings, particularly in his *Concerning the Things in Hades* (περὶ τῶν ἐν Ἅιδου). The ancients seem to have had a poor opinion of the integrity of Heracleides as a source,⁴⁴ and recent scholars are not slow to agree with this, at least as far as his evidence concerning Pythagoras is concerned.

Diogenes⁴⁵ preserves the Heracleidean account of Pythagoras' prior incarnations as follows :

τοῦτόν (Pythagoras) φησιν Ἡρακλείδης ὁ Ποντικός περὶ αὐτοῦ τάδε λέγειν, ὡς εἶη ποτὲ γεγονώς Αἰθαλίδης καὶ Ἑρμοῦ υἱὸς νομισθεῖν· τὸν δὲ Ἑρμῆν εἰπεῖν αὐτῷ ἐλέσθαι ὃ τι ἂν βούληται πλὴν ἀθανασίας. αἰτήσασθαι οὖν ζῶντα καὶ τελευτῶντα μνήμην ἔχειν τῶν συμβαινόντων. ἐν μὲν οὖν τῇ ζωῇ πάντων διαμνημονεῦσαι· ἐπεὶ δὲ ἀποθάνοι, τηρῆσαι τὴν αὐτὴν μνήμην. χρόνῳ δ' ὕστερον εἰς Εὐφορβὸν ἐλθεῖν καὶ ὑπὸ Μενέλεω τρωθῆναι. ὁ δ' Εὐφορβὸς ἔλεγεν, ὡς Αἰθαλίδης ποτὲ γεγόνοι, καὶ ὅτι παρ' Ἑρμοῦ τὸ δῶρον λάβοι καὶ τὴν τῆς ψυχῆς περιπόλησιν, ὡς περιπολήθη καὶ εἰς ὅσα φυτὰ καὶ ζῶια παρεγένετο καὶ ὅσα ἢ ψυχὴ ἐν τῷ Ἅιδῃ ἔπαθε καὶ αἱ λοιπαὶ τίνα ὑπομένουσιν. ἐπειδὴ δὲ Εὐφορβὸς ἀποθάνοι, μεταβῆναι τὴν ψυχὴν αὐτοῦ εἰς Ἑρμότιμον, ὃς καὶ αὐτὸς πίστιν θέλων δοῦναι ἐπανήλθεν εἰς Βραγχίδας καὶ εἰσελθὼν εἰς τὸ τοῦ Ἀπόλλωνος ἱερὸν ἐπέδειξεν ἣν Μενέλαος ἀνέθηκεν ἀσπίδα (ἔφη γὰρ αὐτόν, ὅτ' ἀπέπλει ἐκ Τροίας, ἀναθεῖναι τῷ Ἀπόλλωνι τὴν ἀσπίδα) διασεσηπυῖαν ἤδη, μόνον δὲ

42. Cic. *Tusc. Disp.* v. 3. : *De Nat. Deo.* i. 13. : *De Div.* i. 23. : Suid s. v. *Heracleides* ; Diog. v. 86, iii. 46.

43. v. 86.

44. Diog. viii. 70 gives Timaeus as having called him a 'narrator of incredible tales' (παραδοξόλογος) throughout, who said a man fell from the moon. Cic. *De Nat. Deo.* i. 13. 34 says of him that he 'stuffed his books with puerile tales'; Plut. *Cam.* xxii refers to him as being a 'myth-maker and fictioner.' (μυθώδης καὶ πλασματιανὸντα), and Diog. v. 86 says that he 'wove' (πέπλακεν) subjects into comic and tragic forms.

45. viii. 4= Heracleides fr. 89 (Wehrli).

διαμένον τὸ ἐλεφάντινον πρόσωπον. ἐπειδὴ δὲ Ἑρμότιμος ἀπέθανε, γενέσθαι Πύρρον τον Δῆλιον ἀλιέα· καὶ πάντα πάλιν μνημονεύειν, πῶς πρόσθεν Αἰθαλίδης, εἶτ' Εὐφορβος, εἶτα Ἑρμότιμος, εἶτα Πύρρος γένοιτο· ἐπειδὴ δὲ Πύρρος ἀπέθανε, γενέσθαι Πυθαγόραν καὶ πάντων τῶν εἰρημένων μεμνηῆσθαι.

(This is what Heracleides of Pontus tells us he (Pythagoras) used to say about himself: that he had once been Aethalides and was accounted the son of Hermes, and that Hermes had told him to choose whatever he liked as a gift except immortality; so he asked to retain through life and through death a memory of his experiences. Hence in life he could recall everything, and when he died, he still kept the same memory. Afterwards, in the course of time, his soul entered into Euphorbus and he was wounded by Menelaus. Now Euphorbus used to tell about his having been Aethalides once and that he had received the gift from Hermes and the wandering of his soul, how it transmigrated and into how many plants and animals it had come, and all that it underwent in Hades, and all that other souls await there. When Euphorbus died, his soul passed into Hermotimus, and he also, wishing to authenticate the story, went to the temple of Apollo at Branchidae where he identified the shield which Menelaus, on his voyage back from Troy, had dedicated to Apollo,—so he said,—it being now so rotten through and through that only the ivory facing was left. When Hermotimus died, he became Pyrrhus, the fisherman from Delos, and again he remembered everything,—how he was first Aethalides, then Euphorbus, then Hermotimus, and then Pyrrhus. And when Pyrrhus died, he became Pythagoras, and remembered all the things mentioned.)

Pherecydes is given to have said that Aethalides received as gift from Hermes the privilege for his soul at death to spend part of its time in Hades and part on earth.⁴⁶ Hermes 'as conductor of souls' (*ψυχοπομπός*) not only leads the souls of the dead to Hades, but on occasions, as for instance on the *Anthesteria*, leads them up to earth,—perhaps what he is depicted

46. Fr. 8. According to Sch. Apollon. Rhod. Φερεκίδης δὲ φησιν ὅτι δῶρον εἶχε παρὰ τοῦ Ἑρμοῦ ὁ Αἰθαλίδης τὸ τὴν ψυχὴν αὐτοῦ ποτὲ μὲν ἐν Ἅιδου ποτὲ δὲ ἐν τοῖς ὑπὲρ τὴν γῆν τόποις εἶναι. (Pherecydes says that Aethalides received as gift from Hermes that his soul be some time in Hades and some time in the regions upon the earth.)

doing in the painting on the Jena lekythos.⁴⁷ But clearly there is no implication of reincarnation, even as a privilege restricted to Aethalides, in the notice of Pherecydes concerning him here.

This apparently does not disconcert Heracleides, for he goes on to misrepresent the tradition, not once but twice. When talking of Aethalides, he renders the gift of Hermes as a retention of the memory of his experiences (*μνημὴ . . . τῶν συμβαινόντων*) and thus tries to link him with Pythagoras through the latter's power of birth-recollection. But again, when he has Euphorbus talking of his having been Aethalides, Hermes is not only credited with 'the gift', meaning this retention of memory, but there is also a 'wandering of the soul' (*ψυχῆς περιπόλησις*) possessed by Aethalides which leads him to reincarnate as various plants and animals and, at length, as Euphorbus. Quite obviously Heracleides is making a second and more subtle misconstruction of the legend known to Pherecydes, and for the sole purpose of enlisting Aethalides more firmly into the prior incarnations of Pythagoras.

Hermotimus qualifies from a similar consideration. Not only does his reputed date satisfy the interval of 216 years roughly after Euphorbus, as that of Aethalides before Euphorbus, but he was credited with the singular ability of deserting his body 'for many years' and returning to it from such psychic excursions with much mantic lore and knowledge of the future.⁴⁸ Such a practice would easily lend itself to misrepresentation as an experience of reincarnation. The association of Hermotimus with Pythagoras and Euphorbus is cemented with the anecdote of the recognition of Menelaus' shield transferred to him from Pythagoras. The otherwise unknown fisherman, Pyrrhus, thrown in to complete the intervals, also attempts to allay suspicion, while each incarnation is linked with the preceding one and with certain others as plants and animals and in-between sojourns in Hades with the gift of memory made bestowed on Aethalides by Hermes.

47. First published by Paul Schadow *Eine Attische Grablekythos* Inaug. diss. Jena (1897), reproduced and discussed by J. Harrison in 'Pandora's Box' *Journ. Hell. Stud.* vol. XX (1900), p. 101. See also her *Prolegomena to the Study of Greek Religion*, Cambridge (1933), p. 43. She points out that half-buried jars (*πιθάνακη*) used in jar-burial were found in the Dipylon Cemetery at Athens, at Apidna, at Throiscus, Corfu and other places. The antiquity of this form of burial evidences the antiquity of the *Pythoigia* (opening of the jars)—the Greek all-souls-day, and of Hermes 'conductor of souls' (*ψυχοπομπός*).

48. Apollon. *Mirab.* 3; Pliny *Nat. Hist.* vii. 174; Plut. *De Gen. Socr.* 22, here called Hermodorus as also in Procl. *In Rep.* ii. 113, 24 (Kroll), though this is more than a copyist's error as Rohde thinks, (see op. cit. p. 331 n. 112); surely this subtle change in the name, if anything, recalls the gift (*δῶρον*) given by Hermes (*Ἑρμο-*) to Aethalides! On Hermotimus, see also Porphy. *Vit. Pyth.* 45 and Tert. *De An.* 28.

The whole account, it would seem, is a consummate fiction of Heraclides' authorship, which makes use of the Euphorbus-anecdote, together with other material of an accommodating nature, to dress up the dogma known to Aristoxenus that Pythagoras was wont to reincarnate every 216 years. For our present study, the treatment of memory (*μνημῆ*) here is worth remarking. Where the account of Aristoxenus concerning Pythagoras' reincarnations every 216 years made it appear that reincarnation was an experience restricted to Pythagoras, Heraclides certainly makes it seem that birth-recollection was too. Besides, such recollection is here rendered as something which accompanies him with each incarnation, and in that sense, of an accidental nature, rather than an achievement together with superhuman mental power and within the aspirations of all other human beings as well. It is in fact traced back to that gift of Hermes to Aethalides.

At the same time, Heraclides, in using the same recollection of past lives to account for Pythagoras' knowledge of the afterdeath experiences in Hades, is guilty of confusing the visions of the Pythagorean 'descent to Hades' (*κατάβασις εἰς ᾄδου*) with the memories of past births. The history of this confusion of the *katabasis* to Hades with the ascent of souls from Hades to earth (*ἀνοδος*) i.e. reincarnation, is as old as the earliest evidence of a Pythagorean *katabasis*, namely, the Salmoxis-anecdote in Herodotus.⁴⁹ Even if they did occur in the same written work (*γραφῆ*) at some time,⁵⁰ the tradition that Pythagoras descended into an underground cave, whence he subsequently returned with some knowledge of the occult,

49. Long (*op. cit.* p. 8) dismisses this passage out of hand as of no relevance to the teaching of reincarnation; see also Cherniss *op. cit.* p. 350, n. 1, where he points out that what Pythagoras promised his audience was that they would live for ever, and what he did was to reappear in his own form. The deeds (*δρώμενα*) with which Pythagoras hoped to make his declarations (*λεγόμενα*) become convincing to them (*πιθανά σφι*), however, do not accord with each other. But they do make sense if we recognize here a confusion of reincarnation with a *katabasis*, with this *katabasis* misconstrued as a trick by which Pythagoras attempted to prove rebirth. See also the interesting account by Hermippus in Diog. viii. 41, where Pythagoras' knowledge of the past (together with his Hades-experienced,) are brought within the alleged stunt. See also the anecdote in Iamb. *Vit. Pyth.* 178, (probably derived from Androcydes, the Alexandrian doctor), and see Sch. Soph. *Elect.* 62 and Tert. *De An.* 28.

50. See Rohde *op. cit.* p. 600 and *Rh. Mus.* vol. XXVI (1871), p. 558. The conjunction of the accounts of Pythagoras' previous lives and his descent to Hades is first found among the Greeks of the Hellespont and Pontus (Herodot. iv. 95), and even if it did appear in a written work subsequently, could hardly have been evidence that it was made by Pythagoras and the early school. See also H. Diels 'Ein gefälschtes Pythagorasbuch' *Arch. für Gesch. der Philos.* vol. III (1890), p. 468 f. where he makes it seem probable that this written work was the pseudo-Pythagorean work in Ionian, the tripartite 'Education, Politics, Physics,' (*Παιδευτικόν, Πολιτικόν, Φυσικόν*). He cannot, however, be right in assuming (see p. 469) that the descent-story was invented by Heraclides.

quite clearly indicates a journey undertaken during his lifetime as Pythagoras.⁵¹ The confusion of this with reincarnation is understandable enough, though unfortunately it has also resulted in the suspicion of Pythagoras as being a cheap fraud. Heraclides' inclusion of the experiences of souls in Hades as part of the claimed memories of Pythagoras of the prebirth, however, seems to carry a suspicious echo of Plato *Meno* 81c against the *Republic* myth of Er.⁵²

Dicaearchus is associated with Clearchus⁵³ in giving a slightly variant version of Pythagoras' previous births;—he was Euphorbus, then Pyrandrus, then Aethalides, then a beautiful harlot named Alco. As Wehrli notes,⁵⁴ Pyrandrus is simply a variant of Pyrrhus. As for the substitution of Alco for Hermotimus, her vocation suggests a later inspiration with a definite malicious intent, rather than, as with Empedocles' claimed incarnation as a girl, one aimed at exhausting the types of incarnation the soul could assume.⁵⁵ It is indeed interesting to observe how the story started by Heraclides has already begun to transform itself, presaging the interesting history it was to have. One might mention in passing that the Alco of Dicaearchus and Clearchus reappears as the courtesan Aspasia in Lucian 'Gallus' 19 with the satire fully exploited.

51. So the descent of Orpheus (Eur. *Al.* 357-362; the famous sculptured relief in the Naples museum, reproduced in Brunn-Brückmann, pl. 341 and discussed by Gruppe in Roscher's *Lexicon*, s. v. *Orpheus*, p. 1194; Plato *Symp.* 179d; Isocr. *Bus.* xi. 7 f.), of the Pamphylian Er, son of Armenius (Plato *Rep.* 614b f.), of Thespesius (Plut. *De Sera Num.* Vin. 22) and Timareus (Plut. *De Gen. Socr.* 21 f.). Vergil must surely be following such *katabasis*-accounts when he sends Aeneas to the netherworld (see *Aen.* vi. 264 f.), for Aeneas not only meets his father and learns the destiny of Rome, but sees what is prepared for the good and the evil there. See also *Rig. Veda* x. 135 wherein, as Sanyana, in the commented in the *Ath. Veda* xix seems to explain, the boy mentioned is the same as Nachiketās of the *Taitt. Brahmana* (iii. ii. 8) who went to Yama-loka and returned to earth; (see also *Kath. Upan.* ii. 5; iii. 8, 15; iv. 10-11; vi. 18). Likewise, according to a Javanese MS of the 14th century, the yaksha Kunjarakarna is commanded by Lord Vairocana to go to the kingdom of Yama to see what is prepared there for evil-doers; see *The Legend of Kunjarakarna*, transl. from the Dutch of Professor Kern by L. A. Thomas in *Ind. Ant.* (Bombay), vol. XXXII pp. 111-127.

52. 614b. f. See n. 86 below for the content of the relevant portion of *Meno* 81c.

53. In his note to Dicaearchus fr. 36 on p. 53.

54. Dicaearchus fr. 36 (Wehrli).

55. His fr. 117.

ἦδη γάρ ποτ' ἐγὼ γενόμεν κούρος τε κόρη τε
θάμνος τ' οἰωνός τε καὶ ἕξαλος ἔλλοπος ἰχθύς.

(Already have I been a boy, a girl, a plant, a bird and a dumb sea-fish.) On the basis of the habitable elements, bird represents aerial creatures, fish aquatic, the rest terrestrial; of age, boy and girl represent youth, as Empedocles ('I' advanced years; of sex, boy represents male, girl female; of the three grades of living things, boy and girl human incarnations, bird and fish animal, and plant incarnations. Cf. fr. 20, 21 and 23.

The foregoing pieces of evidence, scrappy though they be, are sufficient to show that Pythagoras did make a claim to be able to recollect his own past incarnations and experiences within them. Three other fragments, however throw a little more light on this singular power of Pythagoras, for they go further to show that he was, at the same time, able to recognize or even have forevision of the states of existence of others, and sometimes to assist them to do so for themselves. The first of these, which is the earliest piece of evidence on Pythagoras' teaching of reincarnation, is also the earliest reference to Pythagoras himself, that is, Xenophanes fr. 7. The fragment itself is quoted by Diogenes,⁵⁶ strangely enough, by way of confirmation of Pythagoras' having himself been different people at different times.

The two elegiac couplets we have read as follows :

καί ποτέ μιν στυφελιζομένου σκύλακος παριόντα
 φασὶν ἐποικτῆραι καὶ τόδε φάσθαι ἔπος·
 παῦσαι μὴδὲ ράπιζ', ἐπεὶ ἡ φίλου ἀνέρος ἐστὶν
 ψυχή, τὴν ἔγνων φθεγξαμένης αὐτῶν.

(Once they say that he was passing by when a dog was being whipped, and he took pity and said, 'Stop, do not beat it; for it is the soul of a friend that I recognized when I heard it howl.'))

If Xenophanes was born around 565 B.C., as is now accepted, he was a contemporary of Pythagoras; in which case, even if he had heard the anecdote he narrates from others, as 'they say' (*φασί*) indicates, we have here good assurance that Pythagoras was in his own lifetime associated with a doctrine of reincarnation, and more important for the present study, with a power of birth recognition. Two difficulties, however, exist concerning this fragment. The first of these is that, as with the Empedocles-fragment, there is nothing in the extant verses of it to assure us that the allusion here is to Pythagoras and no one else. In fact Kern⁵⁷ and Rathmann⁵⁸ thought differently. It remains, however, that Diogenes, even if he is inexact in quoting these verses as proof of Pythagoras' own prior existences, attributes

56. viii. 36. He says: *περὶ δὲ τοῦ ἄλλοτ' ἄλλον αὐτὸν γεγενῆσθαι Ξενοφάνης ἐν ἐλεγείᾳ προσμαρτυρεῖ* . . . (About his having become different things at different times, Xenophanes gives evidence in his elegy. . .)

57. 'Empedocles und die Orphiker' *Arch. für Gesch. der Philos.* vol. I (1888), p. 499.

58. *op. cit.* p. 37.

the reference to Pythagoras, and this, as Cameron⁵⁹ puts it, 'transcends all other non-factual hypotheses'. From the fact that Diogenes was able to quote the first verse of the poem,—it looks more like the first verse of the relevant part of the poem,—it would seem that he or his source (at one or more removes) had better grounds for the ascription than the four verses alone give us. That he cites them as proof of Pythagoras' own prior incarnations is understandable, since they go half-way to this by establishing the fact that Pythagoras definitely apprehended the possibility.

The second matter is how far the anecdote itself can be taken at face-value. Xenophanes is given by Diogenes himself⁶⁰ as holding views contrary to those of Pythagoras. At the same time, he was a notorious satirist of beliefs to which he was hostile, so that it is possible that he may be here lampooning the teachings of Pythagoras, as he did the anthropomorphic polytheism of Homer and Hesiod, for instance. In support of this, Long⁶¹ points out that the other five passages quoted by Diogenes with this one, all ridicule Pythagoras.

The last-mentioned argument has, of course, little point unless it can be shown that Diogenes did select passages of such a nature for some known or unknown reason. Nor is it warranted to treat these verses as of the same calibre as the others of Xenophanes, which are distinctly satirical, unless there are independent grounds for thinking so. The idea of a man reincarnating as an animal is in itself not necessarily satirical; it is openly admitted in the teachings of Empedocles and Plato afterwards, and Euripides probably had this very anecdote in mind when he made Polymestor predict the same fate for Hecuba in his tragedy *Hecuba*,⁶² though the change of form (*μορφῆς μετάστασις*) there is one of metamorphosis or shape-shifting popular among the Celts rather than metempsychosis:

Πλ. κύων γενήσῃ πύρσ' ἔχουσα δέργματα.
 Εκ. πῶς δ' οἶσθα μορφῆς τῆς ἐμῆς μετάστασιν ;
 Πλ. ὁ Θρηξὶ μάντις μάντις εἶπε Διόνυσος τάδε.

(Pol. *A dog with fire-red eyes shalt you become.*
 Hec. *How do you know the changing of my form*
 Pol. *This Dionysius told, the Thracian seer.*)

59. *op. cit.* p. 13.

60. ix. 18.

61. *op. cit.* p. 17.

62. 1265—1267 and f.

If any satire was intended, then, it must have been in the association of the dog with Pythagoras, as the wild-fowl with Malvolio,⁶³ rather than in a self-defeating misrepresentation of the very teaching of Pythagoras. On the other hand, the verse with which Xenophanes' poem was said to open:

νῦν αὐτ' ἄλλον ἔπειμι λόγον, δείξω δὲ κέλευθον.

(*And now I will turn to another story and show the way.*)

if it had any bearing on the anecdote itself, far from suggesting satire, shows that Xenophanes was in all seriousness and even partial to the belief in reincarnation himself!

The second is the fragment of Ion on Pythagoras' prophecy concerning Pherecydes, i.e. fr. 4, though this is seldom treated in discussions of Pythagoras' power of birth-remembering for the good reason that the second couplet of the fragment seems to rest his statement on a knowledge of a different kind. Once again, we have only four verses extant and these are not free from controversy either.

ὡς ὁ μὲν ἠγορέῃ τε κεκασμένος ἠδὲ καὶ αἰδοῖ
καὶ φθίμενος ψυχῇ τερπνὸν ἔχει βίοντον,
εἴπερ Πυθαγόρης ἐτύμως ὁ σοφὸς περὶ πάντων
ἀνθρώπων γνώμας εἶδε καὶ ἐξέμαθεν . . .

(*Thus did he excel in manliness and self-respect, and now that he is dead, he has a blissful existence for his soul,—if Pythagoras, truly the wise, learned and knew true opinions about all men.*)

Rathmann,⁶⁴ arguing that the qualities of manliness (*ἠγορέῃ*) and self-respect (*αἰδώς*) more properly applied to a hero ('*vir fortis*') than a divine ('*theologus*'), concluded that the first two verses must have been grafted to the second pair in later times from a belief that Pherecydes was

63. Shakespeare *Twelfth Night* iv. 2. 52—62.

Clo. What is the opinion of Pythagoras concerning wildfowl?

Mal. That the soul of our grandam might haply inhabit a bird.

Clo. What think'st thou of his opinion?

Mal. I think nobly of the soul, and no way approve his opinion.

Clo. Fare thee well. Remain thou still in darkness: thou shalt hold the opinion of Pythagoras ere I will allow of thy wits; and fear to kill a woodcock, lest thou dispossess the soul of thy grandam. Fare thee well.

64. *op. cit.* p. 44 f.

Pythagoras' teacher. This seems somewhat farfetched. Apart from the easy extension of the qualities of *ἡγορέη* and *αἰδώς* to the moral field, —the two words together encompassing most of the virtues recognized by the Greeks,—there is also reason to think that the tradition associating Pherecydes with Pythagoras was pretty old, it being subsequently picked up by Aristotle.⁶⁵

From another consideration, however, there is need to distinguish these verses, for whereas it seems that the first two verses contain the assertion of Pythagoras about Pherecydes, the second pair expresses Ion's own observation about the reliability of that assertion. According to Pythagoras, so did Pherecydes excel in manliness and self-respect that in death he has for his soul an existence of bliss; according to Ion, this would be so if Pythagoras learned and knew true opinions about all men.

The distinction of what Pythagoras is cited as authority for from what is in fact Ion's is, however, not beyond question. One possibility is that Ion cites Pythagoras only for the blissful existence Pherecydes' soul is thought to have,—that is, only for the content of the second verse,—while the assertion about his high moral attainments and any implied connection between this and that afterdeath state, is Ion's own. Again, it is possible that Pythagoras had only afforded a general doctrine about virtue and its posthumous rewards,⁶⁶ while Ion is responsible for applying the particular instance of Pherecydes to this and making an assumption. H. Gomperz⁶⁷ maintains some such view, but confines Pythagoras' teaching to the belief in the survival of the soul. According to him, this probably means no more than 'If Pythagoras is right about the survival of the soul, then Pherecydes' soul should be enjoying a blessed existence'. In these last two cases, too, the 'wisdom' of Pythagoras would matter a great deal to the truth of the

65. See n. 5 above and p. 203 below.

66. According to Chrysippus (apud Aul. Gell. vii. 2. 12) the Pythagoreans conceived of suffering as self-sought (*αὐθαίρετα*). In life, mortal beings are as in a prison of sorts (*ἐν τῷ φρουρᾷ*), and so are souls in bodies; the gods are our warders, and escape by suicide condemned as wrongful; (Plato *Phaedo* 61d—62b). Pythagoras, in the only reference to him by Plato (*Rep.* 600b), is said to have taught a 'way of life' and is admired for it by Plato himself, and we learn from Alexander (apud Diog. viii. 32) that to the Pythagoreans, the winning of the soul to good or evil was of the greatest moment. The Pythagorean *katabasis* too must surely indicate a strong moral element in his conception of life and the afterdeath; Alexander (apud Diog. viii. 31) has a notice about the dead, which must come from the *katabasis*-account, which tells of the different treatment meted to good and evil in Hades. It is difficult to believe that Pythagoras taught either a magical form of reincarnation as, is found delineated by Herodotus ii. 123, or a mechanistic, as is evidenced by Aristoxenus fr. 12 (Wehrli), Eudemus fr. 88 (Wehrli), and Porphyry *Vit. Pyth.* 19, though such concepts of 'necessity' (*ἀναγκή*) may have been applied by certain later Pythagoreans to the cycle of rebirth.

67. *Wiener Stud.* vol. XLVII (1929), p. 14 n. 3.

assumption, though then *περὶ πάντων ἀνθρώπων* should more properly be understood as 'about all men in general' rather than 'about all men individually'.

It is likely that Ion was talking about Pherecydes' moral qualities in the verses immediately preceding those that we have in the fragment, since these latter seem to be occasioned by some such subject; but he would hardly have taken it upon himself to bring these moral qualities into a causal connection with Pherecydes' posthumous bliss, when he had to rest on Pythagoras for the very fact of that posthumous bliss. One of the reasons for thinking that Pythagoras was associated with Pherecydes as a friend or pupil is this very fragment of Ion, but, as we supposed earlier,⁶⁸ the tradition cannot have wholly originated from this and could very well represent a fact. In which case, it is more probable that Ion is citing Pythagoras, when talking about Pherecydes, on something particular that he had said about the man than as authority for a general doctrine which might apply to any one at all, Ion himself incidentally (or coincidentally) applying it to Pherecydes. Besides, if that general doctrine was restricted to the survival of the soul after death, it was popular enough in Greece and in no way peculiar to Pythagoras,—not even where such survival is thought to be in a blissful state,—so as to require his especial testimony.

Pherecydes, according to tradition, fell ill in Delos of louse-disease and Pythagoras came from Italy and cared for him till he died.⁶⁹ Even if the account is fictitious, as some think,⁷⁰ there is no reason to doubt that Pherecydes died during the lifetime of Pythagoras, and if Pythagoras 'flourished' in Samos,⁷¹ during the later part of it, when he had settled in Italy. The comment of Pythagoras which we have from Ion must have been made at some time thereafter. It might, however, be argued that what we have here is a prophecy made by Pythagoras before the death of Pherecydes, which, after that death has taken place, Ion talks of as a fact (provided, of course, Pythagoras, truly the wise, had the knowledge to make true prophesies on such matters.) No one, as far as I know, has sug-

68. See p. 202

69. See Diog. i. 118 who gives this on the authority of Aristoxenus. See also Diod. x. 3. 4. Porph. *Vit. Pyth.* 56 derives the information from Dicaearchus, but Dicaearchus may himself be relying on one other than Aristoxenus.

70. See for instance Raven in G. S. Kirk and J. E. Raven *The Presocratic Philosophers*, Cambridge (1957), p. 49.

71. According to Apollodorus, in 532/1 B.C., during the reign of the tyrant Polycrates. He is said to have left Samos, where he had spent his early life (see Herodot. iv. 95), to escape the tyranny (Porph. *Vit. Pyth.* 9), and to have settled at Croton in South Italy, where he appears to have risen to a position of great authority (Diog. viii. 3).

gested that this is what must have happened, nor is it the most obvious interpretation. At the same time, it is not the more remarkable than a declaration based on some claimed power to know about such afterdeath states, nor the more sure, whereas both these qualities are implied by the very fact that Ion thinks he must qualify them immediately afterwards.

The second couplet, however, far from suggesting that Pythagoras had made this statement from knowledge gained through some kind of extra-sensory perception, talks of it as gained by learning from others.⁷² The sense of this couplet must be: '... if Pythagoras was right (sc. about the afterlife)'; but this seems somewhat obscurely and ineffectively expressed by the apparent meaning. Hence various conjectures. Wilamowitz⁷³ thought that by knowing mens' minds, Pythagoras also knew whether they deserved a happy afterlife. Kranz⁷⁴ rightly refutes this; following Diels⁷⁵ he takes *περὶ πάντων ἀνθρώπων* together to translate 'about all men,' and understands *γνώμας* to mean 'Einsichten.' Sandbach⁷⁶ recently suggested the emendation *σοφὸς ὃς* for *ὁ σοφός* (thus reading '... if Pythagoras, truly the wise, *who* learned and knew ..'), and saw in these words, not merely an allusion to Heraclitus on Pythagoras, (as Kranz recognized), but also a reply to him. This does not, however, liberate the 'wisdom', with which Pythagoras is supposed to have made the assertion about Pherecydes, from what is now the content of the relative clause, since the latter must be significant, and can only be so as a qualification of the former.

What is to be remarked in the present context is that the second couplet registers Ion's own observation on the 'wisdom' and that the notion here appearing about it is strictly his, the subjectivity being even more clear when it is taken in the light of Heraclitus' references. The same point must be made where some have found Ion's 'truly' (*ἐτύμως*) sarcastic,—that it does not affect the tradition itself which he hands down with the quotation in the first couplet. So that the 'wisdom' which enabled Pythagoras to learn about Pherecydes' posthumous existence may be of a completely

72. See n. 28 above.

73. 'Lese-fruchte' *Hermes* vol. LXII (1927), p. 281.

74. See 'Vorsokratisches I und II' *Hermes* vol. LXIX (1934), p. 227 f., where also the different translations of the second couplet are discussed.

75. *Vors.* I. p. 380. He translates: '...So hat er (Pherecydes) zwar, durch Mannesmut ausgezeichnet und durch Ehrgefühl, auch nach seinem Tode für seine Seele ein erfreuliches Leben, wenn denn in Wahrheit Pythagoras der Weise über alle Menschen hinaus Einsichten erfuhr und kennen lernte; (*jener aber*.....)

76. *loc. cit.*

different nature to that ridiculed by Heraclitus, and Ion guilty of confusing them from an impression all his own. Would it not appear rather to be an apperception of that remarkable faculty for which Pythagoras was famous, with which he at some time recognized the metempsychosis of another friend of his as a dog ?

Bluck⁷⁷ cannot be right in thinking that the blissful existence talked of here is in a new incarnation, for this is assured Pherecydes, not merely now that he is dead (*φθίμενος*), but expressly for his soul (*ψυχῆι*), the expression itself clearly indicating a disincarnate existence. Add to this the fact that it is assured Pherecydes for his special moral attainments, and it would seem that the allusion is to some ultimate state of liberation from incarnation;⁷⁸ and who would be more deserving of this, in Pythagoras' estimate, than the old theologus and his own reputed guru in that subject which Aristotle would best classify as miracle-working (*τερατοποιία*).

The legend of Pythagoras, beginning with Xenophanes and gathering strength with the reference of Empedocles, seems to have swelled into a fair concourse of anecdotes and notices which accredited him with much that had grown around other remarkable men much as Abaris, Aristeias and Pherecydes. Later writers drew upon the work of Aristotle on Pythagoras, the meagre extant citations from which⁷⁹ suggest that he must have set about indiscriminately compiling all that he could learn about Pythagoras, or had a pupil of his do so, perhaps with the good reason that little was known about that man with any degree of certainty at that time, and that too was liable to be, (as it actually happened,) overgrown by later fictions of all sorts.

In these fragments it would appear that Pythagoras, like Pherecydes predicted a disaster concerning a ship; and again, like Pherecydes, the fall of Sybaris, the faction which the Pythagoreans suffered; as Abaris carried a golden arrow in proof of his Apollonine mission, Pythagoras displayed

77. *op. cit.* p. 67.

78. Arist. *De An.* A2. 404a 16, Alex. *apud* Diog. viii. 31=32 and Claud. ii. 7, p. 120. 12 (Engelbr.) = *Vors.* (44. B. 22) are not evidence of an ultimate state of liberation, but where incarnate existence was considered undesirable, it is only to be expected that the goal of endeavour must be some form of disincarnate existence. See also p. 210 below.

79. See *Vors.* pp. 98—99 = fr. 191 and 192 (Rose) esp. The title of the work is given in these as *Concerning the Pythagoreans* (*περὶ τῶν Πυθαγορείων*), and again as *Concerning the Pythagorean Philosophy* (*περὶ τῆς Πυθαγορικῆς φιλοσοφίας*) so that it may not have been limited to Pythagoras' life and teachings alone, but included the various doctrines and studies of the early school which could not be distinguished from those of the master.

a golden thigh; a story of bilocation is told of him which parallels that of Aristeias; and like Abaris and Aristeias at least, he was associated with the Hyperborean Apollo.

But the notice that Pythagoras caused Mullias of Croton to call to mind that he was, in a former incarnation, the Phrygian Midas, son of Gordias, and to foreknow his future life as that of a white eagle,⁸⁰ is characteristically Pythagorean and could very well be old and genuine. Who Midas was is, of course, all too well known, but we know nothing of Mullias except that he was, according to the catalogue of Pythagoreans in Iamblichus,⁸¹ a Pythagorean of Croton, and his wife, Timycha, one of the famous Pythagorean women. As for the story itself, there appears to be nothing suspicious about it; quite probably it originated in the school at Croton and passed on to the public who talked about it much as they did the episode mentioned by Xenophanes about Pythagoras and the dog. On the other hand, it is evidence of new and other dimensions in which Pythagoras could wield his power of birth-recollecting and birth-recognizing, for while it makes it an easy inference that he could foreknow the birth, or births, awaiting himself, it actually implies that he could assist others to discover for themselves the births awaiting themselves, (besides recollect those they had already undergone.)

The evidence, then, though scanty, comes out strongly to show that, from the first, Greek reincarnation-teaching, like the Buddhist, was associated with a belief in the possibility of recollecting past births, and that Pythagoras himself, like the Buddha,⁸² was not merely a teacher of a doctrine of which the central tenet was one of reincarnation, but appeared to have reached a state of being in which he could call to mind his various former existences. When he exercised the power of his intellect, it seems, he could reach as far back as ten or twenty lifetimes of men and recollect every single experience of his in these. On good authority we have it that he

80. Vors. I, p. 99=fr. 191 (Rose).

81. *Vit. Pyth.* 267=*Vors.* I. pp. 446—448.

82. In Pali-Buddhism, such a being is known as a *jātissara*, and the knowledge consisting of the memory of pre-existence *pubbenivāsānussatiñāna*. On the Buddha's capacity, see for instance the 'Patisam' of the 12th bk. of the *Khud. Nik.*: "The rahat is endowed with the power called *pubbenivāsāñāna* of revealing his various former existences. Thus am I acquainted with one existence, two existences, . . . a hundred thousand existences, . . . I know that I was born in such a place, bearing such a name, descended from such a race, . . ." See also Ashvagosha's *Life of the Buddha* on this, and particularly the stories of the *Jāt. Māla*. Apparently the Buddha claimed unlimited retrocognition (*yāvad eva ākañkhāmi*); see *Majj. Nik.* i. 482. Compare Sri Krishna in the *Bhag. Gita* iv. 5: "Many lives, Arjuna, you and I have lived; I remember them all, but thou dost not." On the whole question of recollection, see A. K. Coomaraswamy 'Recollection, Indian and Platonic' *Journ. Am. Orient. Soc.* suppl. 3 with vol. LXIV (1944), pp. 1—18.

was the son of Mnesarchus, and true to his father's name, he had, in the opinion of antiquity, this ability to trace his origin far beyond that given him by that father of his. There was a tradition that he was, in one incarnation, Euphorbus who fought in the Trojan War and was slain by Menelaus, and that he proved this by recognizing the shield of Menelaus—or, more likely, recognized the shield to be that of Menelaus upon seeing it,—in the temple of Apollo at Branchidae or at some other place.

The *Visuddhi-Magga*⁸³ recognizes six classes of persons who could call to mind former 'habitations', but even the lowest of these is thought capable of recalling an immense number of such. Even if 'ten and twenty' in the fragment of Empedocles about Pythagoras meant an indefinite number, it is hardly likely that the Greeks would have thought in terms of such immensities of time as the Indian reincarnation-religions. It would be unreasonable, at any rate, to attempt assessing the potentialities of Pythagoras according to what we find there. On the other hand, it is likely that the technique adopted in calling to mind among the Pythagoreans was more or less the same, a 'reaching out' (*ὄρεξις*) with the full powers of the intellect in a retrograde order rather than by an *ekstasis* of some kind.⁸⁴ It is a reasonable guess that the Pythagorean memory-training had the recovery of memories of past lives as its ultimate purpose.⁸⁵

The fragment of Empedocles is of special significance in the study of Platonic *anamnesis* from its association of knowledge with recollection of prebirth experiences. For Empedocles quite clearly thinks that the great wealth of intelligence and mastery over wise deeds possessed by Pythagoras was the result of his unique ability to draw upon the experiences of earlier

83. xiii.

84. Compare the Buddhist method of 'calling to mind' described in *Vis. Mag.* at *loc. cit.* and the method of 'search' (*ζήτησις*) advocated in *Meno* 81c (see n. 86 below) which proceeds from the recollection of one thing to the recollection of all. In Buddhism, it is stated that when the fourth jhana is attained immediately prior to entering the *arūpajhāna* (formless mystical states) the mind is 'clear and cleansed' (*parisuddha-*, *pariyodata-*: see *Dīg. Nik.* i. 75—76) and that when the mind is clear cleansed, it acquires certain extrasensory faculties whereby it is possible to have a vision of one's past births (see *Dīg. Nik.* i. 82) as well as the 'decease and survival of beings'. The subject is said to 'turn and direct his mind to knowing and seeing' (*Dīg. Nik.* i. 76). The whole is compared to a journey from village to village where one is able to recall the details of the journey (*Dīg. Nik.* i. 81). In the subsequent dialogues of Plato, where the objects of *anamnesis* are the Forms and no less, the method of awakening recollection is no other than dialectics.

85. On Pythagorean memory-training see Diod. x. 5 and lambl. *Vit. Pyth.* 164 f. See Dodds *op. cit.* p. 173, n. 107.

lives. In its earliest appearance, that is, in the *Meno*,⁸⁶ Platonic *anamnesis* takes some such form, for that which is forgotten and needs to be recollected or recovered, is not the Forms encountered by a disincarnate soul in a supra-celestial region (*ὑπερουράνιος τόπος*), but particular things and particular experiences which the soul, incarnate upon this earth in previous lives, had perceived and undergone,—the ‘existing things’ (*ὄντα*) of the Empedocles-fragment (—to which Plato adds the experiences in Hades.) All these are latent in memory, and ‘learning’ is no more than *anamnesis* of these. The memory of the slave boy is not merely that of his experiences during the few years since his birth; it is something which stretches beyond the intra-uterine experiences of Freudian psychoanalysis into innumerable other existences of his soul before it was born to the present condition. There are, however, no implications of anything like an epistemological theory in the Empedocles-statement, as Cameron⁸⁷ would have liked to see.

Of Mahāvīra it is said that, becoming an arahat and a Jina comprehending all, he knew of gods, men and demons, ‘whence they come, where they go, whether they are born as men or animals, or become gods or helibeings’.⁸⁸ So, the power of discovering the births of others is one of the six powers of Buddhist *abhiññā*, he who was entered the fourth *jhāna* gaining ‘knowledge of the decease and survival of beings’ (*sattānaṃ cutārapātānāyā*).⁸⁹ The earliest piece of evidence on Pythagoras, the Xeno-

86. *loc. cit.* Here Socrates asserts: “*Ἀτε οὖν ἡ ψυχὴ ἀθάνατός τε οὔσα καὶ πολλάκις γεγονυῖα καὶ ἑωρακυῖα καὶ τὰ ἐνθάδε καὶ τὰ ἐν Ἄιδου καὶ πάντα χρήματα, οὐκ ἔστιν ὅτι οὐ μεμάθηκεν· ὥστε οὐδὲν θαυμαστὸν καὶ περὶ ἀρετῆς καὶ περὶ ἄλλων οἷον τ’ εἶναι αὐτὴν ἀναμνησθῆναι, ἃ γὰρ καὶ πρότερον ἠπίστατο. ἄτε γὰρ τῆς φύσεως ἀπάσης συγγενοῦς οὔσης, καὶ μεμαθηκυῖας τῆς ψυχῆς ἅπαντα, οὐδὲν κωλύει ἐν μόνον ἀναμνηθέντα—ὃ δὴ μάθησιν καλοῦσιν ἄνθρωποι—τἄλλα πάντα αὐτὸν ἀνευρεῖν, εἴαν τις ἀνδρείος ἦ καὶ μὴ ἀποκάμνη ζητῶν. τὸ γὰρ ζητεῖν ἄρα καὶ τὸ μαθάνειν ἀνάμνησις ὅλον ἐστίν.*

(Since, then, the soul is immortal and has been born many times and seen all the things in this world and in Hades, there is nothing it has not learnt. No wonder, then, that it is able to recall to mind goodness and other things, which it had in fact understood before. For, in as much as all nature is akin and the soul has learnt everything, nothing prevents the man who has recollected—or, as people say, learnt,—one single thing from discovering all the rest for himself, if he will be resolute and not weary in the search; for searching and learning are nothing but recollecting.)

87. p. 190 and n. 24 above.

88. *Ākaran. Sūt.* ii. 15. 26.

89. See *Dīg. Nik.* i. 82. ‘With his clear paranormal clairvoyant vision he sees beings dying and being reborn, the low and the high, the fair and the ugly, the good and the evil, each according to his karma.’ It is said of the Buddha (*Majj. Nik.* i. 170) that ‘there arose in him knowledge and insight that Uddaka Rāmaputta had died the previous night. Where there is knowledge of rebirth according to karma, the form, state and condition of rebirth would surely have been known.

phanes-fragment, remarkably enough attests a similar power as having been possessed by Pythagoras of recognizing the births of others as well, but the recognition here is made on the instant. On the other hand, it seems to have been evoked by the voice of the dog, that is, factitiously, which in Buddhist estimation would be of a lower order.⁹⁰ However, his knowledge of the blissful existence of Pherecydes' soul must have been unaided and direct.

Now, the discovery of one's own past existences and the experiences within them, wherever this occurs, is a feat of memory (*μνημή*). This is true of the two instances in the Celtic sages as well, that of Mongan knowing his former existence as Fionn,⁹¹ and that of the two swineherds,⁹² though there may be some doubt whether these accounts are actually of reincarnation as we understand the term, or of the popular Celtic shape-shifting. All the experiences of the 'transmigrant' (be that a 'soul' (*ψυχή*), an 'occult-self' (*δαίμων*), or a 'stream of consciousness' which takes on different 'selves' as it takes on different bodies) in all its prior 'lives' can be drawn upon by the being that it becomes at any given incarnation, if only that being is capable of exercising, and of exercising to the requisite degree, the power of retrocognition. And it need be remarked that all such retrocognition must be of experiences personal to the 'transmigrant' or what it has learnt, and clearly not anything that has not accrued to the memory in any of those past existences (on this earth or elsewhere) or in the present one. Thus Pythagoras recollected that he was once Euphorbus and recollected the appearance of that man's shield, and if his friend who was reincarnated as a dog was a friend of his in a former existence of his, (though this is not the best inference,)⁹³ he must have remembered the voice of this man through his power of birth-remembering. On the other hand, his knowledge of Pherecydes' existence of bliss for obvious reasons, cannot derive from memory and must rightly be considered birth-recognition based on a power of clairvoyance, such as was claimed to have been possessed by Mahāvira, the Buddha and certain other beings of high mental attainments.

90. See Coomaraswamy *op. cit.* p. 6, f.

91. See particularly the *Märchen*. In one story, Mongan has a dispute with his poet regarding the death of the hero Fothad. The Fian Caoile returns from the dead to prove him right, and he says, 'We were with thee, with Fionn'. Mongan bids him be silent, because he did not wish his identity with Fionn to be made known. 'Mongan, however, was Fionn, though he would not let it be told'. See A. Nutt and K. Meyer *The Voyage of Bran*, London (1895—97) vol. I, p. 45 f. text and transl; see also J. A. MacCullough *The Religion of the Ancient Celts*, Edinburgh (1911) esp. p. 350 f.

92. *The Tale of the Two Swineherds*. There is a skilful fusion here, because the reborn personages preserve a remembrance of their former transformations. See MacCullough *op. cit.* p. 353; and see W. F. Skene *Four Ancient Books of Wales*, Edinburgh (1868) vol. I. pp. 276 and 532

93. Note 'for it is the soul of a friendly man' (*ἐπεὶ ἡ φίλου ἀνέρος ἐστὶν ψυχή.*) This is not a case of sheer inference based on something similar in the voice of that friend and the howl of the dog, but an actual recognition of the reincarnation of that man's *soul*, with that quality of the voice merely prompting or assisting the recognition.

According to Aristotle,⁹⁴ the Pythagoreans, in their most secret teachings, observed a distinction of rational beings into three categories, men, gods and 'beings like Pythagoras'. Whether the soul liberated from the wheel of births, in Pythagorean teachings, became a god, we do not know, though certainly the *daemon* of Empedocles ultimately enjoys some such status.⁹⁵ All that can be known is that it enjoyed an existence of bliss. On the other hand, the category of 'beings like Pythagoras', which comes between men and gods, must describe those who are on the threshold of liberation from incarnation, here on this earth for the last time. Pherecydes was surely recognized as another such, and it is to some such status that Empedocles equates himself when he already talks of himself as 'an immortal god, a mortal no more' (*θεὸς ἀμβροτος οὐκέτι θνητός*).⁹⁶

We need not go into all the attributes that such a being may have been thought to be endowed with, but it would appear that these Greek *anagamins*, or non-returners to the world of men, claimed this singular power of birth-remembering, as the instances of Pythagoras and Empedocles show, and perhaps also knowledge by clairvoyance of the birth-states of others. But, as in the Indian religions, this ability of birth-remembering was not thought of as accidental or a privilege and exclusive to certain chosen individuals, but one that could be exercised by all those who had acquired the necessary degree of mental concentration and observed the technique of retrocognition. Thus Pythagoras was able to assist Mullias to recall his own past births and become, like himself, a birth-rememberer.

The notice about Mullias, however, is more than an instance of re-collecting past existences; it goes on to say that, under Pythagoras' assistance, Mullias was able to foreknow the existence awaiting him, that is, as a white eagle. If the presupposition is that both discoveries were made by the same means and in the same manner, it must be mistaken; for while retrocognition is of that which is experienced and thus in memory, foreknowledge is by precognition of that which is still to be experienced. Such a dis-

94. *Vors.* I. p. 99 = fr. 192 (Rose).

95. *Frr.* 146 and 147; see also fr. 112 vs. 4, and re. this, n. 96 below.

96. Fr. 112 vs. 4; see also fr. 113; he claims to excel 'all perishable mortal men' (*θνητῶν περίεμι πολυθιρέων ἀνθρώπων*). As the so-called *Orphic Tablets* would put it, he has 'suffered the suffering', 'paid the penalty for deeds unrighteous'. Such a being would no more return to the world of composite things. Like the Buddhist *arahat*, his realization of divinity need not coincide with death; he may continue his 'residual' existence for many years, but since he has worked out his sentence and removed the cause of rebirth, he will no more be reborn. See E. Zurcher, *Buddhism*, London (1962), p. 27. Superhuman powers were associated with such beings in Greece as in India, Empedocles claiming to be able to perform similar feats as were associated with Pythagoras and Pherecydes.

inction is observed in Buddhism when the Buddha explains that 'with regard to the past the Tathagata's consciousness follows in the wake of his memory', while 'with regard to the future the Tathagata has the knowledge resulting from enlightenment....'⁹⁷ One also wonders whether the Pythagoreans, like the Buddhists, while claiming limitless knowledge of the past, restricted precognitive knowledge to the life immediately ahead, only so much being possible where the nature of each existence is greatly modifiable and modified by that which immediately precedes it.

There is no trace of birth-recollection or birth-recognition in the extant passages of Pindar which deal with reincarnation-eschatology,⁹⁸ but Empedocles claims the same power that he admires in Pythagoras⁹⁹ and also pretends to foreknow the life awaiting him at death.¹⁰⁰ Thereafter, the notion of recollection is notably taken up by Plato together with the doctrine of reincarnation and used as an eschatological basis for the solution of the problem of epistemology,—how is knowledge possible if it implies that we must both know and not know?¹⁰¹ But with him, that which was the recollection of personal and particular experiences of past incarnations with Pythagoras, at length becomes the recollection of the Forms themselves encountered by the disincarnate soul before it fell into incarnate existence in the first instance,¹⁰² though in deference to the fact that what can be recollected must always be what has been built into the memory at some time or other, Plato sees to it that these Forms *are* encountered by the soul.

97. *Dīg. Nik.* iii. 134. Here in the Pāsādika Sutta it is said, 'It is possible that other heretical teachers may say 'the Recluse Gotama has a limitless knowledge and vision with regard to the past but not with regard to the future'...' See K. N. Jayatilleke *Early Buddhist Theory of Knowledge*, London (1963), esp. pp. 468—469. (Refer Aristotle on Epimenides in p. 216 and n. 9 above).

98. *Olymp.* ii. 53—83 and fr. 127 (Bowra)=fr. 133 (Bergk).

99. See n. 19 above.

100. See fr. 112 vs. 4 and fr. 113, also 146 and 147. If this is inference in his case, it is like the inference of the Buddha arising from the enlightenment that 'this is the final birth...' (*Dīg. Nik.* iii. 134).

101. *Meno* 80c ff. The eristic argument has been suggested by Meno 'that it is not possible for a man to seek either what he knows, for he knows it and there is no need of a search for such a man,—or what he does not know, for he does not know what he shall seek'. Socrates, however, does not think this contention sound, but instead of a direct rebuttal, he makes a digression concerning the immortality of the soul and its ability to recollect all that it had seen in previous lives.

102. *Phaedo* 72c—77a; *Phaedr.* 264a f. The *Meno* kept recollection well within the context of reincarnation, even though already Plato must have realised that the objects of recollection were the Forms; the fact that if all our previous lives were on level with the present one, the problem of knowledge would not be solved but only thrown back, is not taken care of there; so far from solving the Sophists' paradox, this theory is a prey to it. The *Phaedo* recognizes the epistemological priority of the Forms to particulars and solves this by a 'separation' (*χωρισμός*). This is the core of the argument for *anamnesis* in this work and is of paramount significance in the Platonic metaphysics and ethics. See R. E. Allen 'Anamnesis in Plato's *Meno* and *Phaedo*' *Rev. of Met.* vol. XIII (1959), p. 167 f. and 171; See also F. M. Cornford *Principium Sapientiae* Cambridge (1952), p. 57.

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At the same time, the power of recollection of such prebirth visions is not to Plato an exceptional and exclusive power acquired by beings who have achieved superhuman excellence, but is reduced to an ordinary epistemological process active in all alike in all instances of cognition, learning being nothing more than recollecting or calling to mind that which was forgotten.

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