Modeling inter-temporal impacts of judicial autonomy and security risks upon defense spending: a case for Pakistan

Abstract

Introduction

Pakistan is the 6th largest army in the world. Historically speaking Pakistan relished high geopolitical significance during the cold war regime and initiation of the Marshall plan. This has border disputes with some of the neighboring countries in the region has to maintain deterrence due to unpleasant ties with India and is facing a state of insurgency and extremism, which currently is a wide spread phenomenon in the country (Deger, 1990).

Leverages and favoritism as extended by judiciary in form of taking oath on provisional constitutional order (PCO) has provided an extra institutional support for military regimes, causing a further increase in military spending. Sizable demand for military spending along with the supply side pull factors such as the international security assistance, aid for military, foreign aid in response to the war against terrorism, have serious implications for Pakistan. Pakistan has witnessed numerous internal and external tensions over the course of years including sectarian violence, rise in terrorism across country, insurgency in Baluchistan, border tensions as well as proxy wars by some of the neighboring countries.

Many countries do feel that terrorism is rising and it should be given first preference to fight. They feel that terrorism is now changing its shape and is becoming more and more complex through the use of mass media and eventually making use of weapons causing chemical, biological and nuclear mass destruction (Deutch, 1997). Counteract terrorism and the war on terrorism will impact all other sectors quite negatively still they didn’t object to the notion to present a unified front against the war on terrorism (Brady, 2002).

Despite aspects of conventional culture of inefficacies, specifically in the third and forth levels of judiciary regarding low rates of conviction, limited access to justice by vulnerable communities, justice delayed and nepotism (Voigt and Guttmann, 2014). Especially during the military interventions, the judiciary has been under severe criticism for extending leverage and undue leniency by declaring such interventions as lawful and providing a protective shield (Voigt et al., 2015) to such regimes by taking oath on PCO. The proposed framework of analysis specifically looks into the lead-led effect of this extended role of judiciary appearing in form of taking oath on PCO, during the military interventions, upon preferences for defense spending.

Corruption perception index (PCI) reveals that the perception of corruption for judiciary is comparable to that of other organs of the state and that 96% respondents reported corruption and bribe culture by officials in judiciary (Transparency International, 2002). The World Justice project (2015) shows that Pakistan with a regional rank of 4 out of 6 and 83 out of 102 in ‘absence of corruption’ in global ranking. And with a regional rank 5 out of 6 and 91 out of 102 for ‘provision of fundamental rights’ in global ranking. Further, with a regional rank of 4 out 6 & 91 out of 102 in ‘civil justice’ of global ranking. Moreover, with a regional rank of 5 out of 6 and 94 out of 102 in ‘criminal justice’ in global ranking. With regards to polarization, the culture of discrimination and working without influences, in ‘lawful transition of power’ with a rating of 0.45, for ‘due process of law’ with a rating of 0.27, in ‘no improper influence in regularity enforcement’ with a rating of 0.37, in ‘no discrimination in civil justice’ with a score of 0.37, in ‘no discrimination in criminal justice’ with a score of 0.28.

Autonomy of judges can be divided into four categories; institutional independence, financial independence, personal independence and functional independence. Institutional independence is compromised when seeking or taking information from others may be manoeuvred. Personal independence is compromised if judges’ tenure is suspended before the retirement age. Functional independence is compromised if other stake holders like the legislature or army influences the workings of the judges. Finally financial independence is compromised if the courts are unable to fulfil the judges’ mandates (Andeans, 2007).

Aspects of judicial autonomy as well as security risks, affecting defence spending in inter-temporal settings have not been explicitly quantified for Pakistan, in the literature at hand. So this study tries to fill this gap.